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ABSTRACT 
This thesis highlights the limitations of the existing one-to-one intra-operational  
area (OA) emergency operations center (EOC) coordination model during catastrophic 
disasters. In addition, it establishes a clear need for a more effective alternate model and 
offers an alternative, multilateral collaborative model solution—the zone EOC concept. 
Designed to enable manageable “span of control” and address shortages in available 
trained EOC personnel, the zone EOC concept involves establishing consolidated EOCs 
to represent geographic zones that encompass multiple cities, townships, and special 
districts within an OA. When activated, the zone EOCs would coordinate with an OA 
EOC on behalf of their constituent jurisdictions within each zone.  
The thesis provides a detailed outline and analysis of the zone EOC concept and 
its various elements in the context of the San Mateo County OA and notes key aspects for 
successful adoption and implementation. The portability and applicability of the zone 
EOC concept in other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond is also considered 
and further exploration is recommended. 
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. RISK ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................2 
B. PROBLEM SPACE .........................................................................................4 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................8 
D. PURPOSE OF STUDY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH ..............8 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................9 
1. Complexity Theory ............................................................................10 
2. Holism .................................................................................................11 
3. Predictable Surprise ..........................................................................12 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................................14 
G. THESIS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW ................................................16 
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EOC STAFFING CAPABILITIES AND AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE SAN MATEO COUNTY OPERATIONAL AREA ........19 
A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EOC STAFFING CAPABILITIES ................19 
B. OVERVIEW: THE SAN MATEO COUNTY OPERATIONAL 
AREA ..............................................................................................................22 
III. THE ZONE EOC CONCEPT...................................................................................29 
A. LEGAL VALIDITY.......................................................................................30 
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ....................................................................31 
1. Activation ............................................................................................31 
2. Zone Demarcations ............................................................................32 
3. Zone EOC Facilities ...........................................................................34 
4. Organization and Authorities ...........................................................35 
5. Staffing ................................................................................................37 
6. Operations ..........................................................................................38 
7. Joint Information Center/Joint Information System .....................39 
8. Situational Awareness Tools .............................................................40 
9. Deactivation ........................................................................................42 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................42 
IV. THE ZONE EOC CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION AND PORTABILITY .....45 
A. ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION ...................................................45 
B. PORTABILITY AND APPLICABILITY ...................................................47 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................49 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................49 
1. Further Develop and Implement the Zone EOC Concept in the 
San Mateo County OA.......................................................................49 
2. Socialize the Zone EOC Concept and Promote Portability in 
the San Francisco Bay Area ..............................................................50 
B. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................51 
 viii 
APPENDIX A. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS, 
POLICIES, GUIDELINES, AND USE OF TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS .........53 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................53 
B. THE STAFFORD ACT .................................................................................53 
C. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK .................................................54 
D. NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ..............................55 
1. Incident Command System ...............................................................56
2. Area Commands.................................................................................56
3. Emergency Operations Center .........................................................57
4. Policy Group .......................................................................................58
5. Department Operations Center ........................................................58
6. Multiagency Coordination System ...................................................58
7. Joint Information System and Joint Information Center ..............60
E. STANDARDIZED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM .............61 
F. MUTUAL AID ...............................................................................................62 
1. Interstate: Emergency Management Assistance Compact ............63
2. California State Mutual Aid Systems ...............................................63
3. Mutual Aid System ............................................................................64
4. Mutual Aid Regions ...........................................................................65
5. Mutual Aid Coordinators ..................................................................66
G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS ...............66 
1. Mass Notification Systems .................................................................68
2. Geographic Information Systems .....................................................70
3. Web EOC / CAL EOC .......................................................................70
4. CAL COP ............................................................................................71
H. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................71 
APPENDIX B. CHALLENGES IN THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
DISCIPLINE ..............................................................................................................73 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................73 
B. THE POLITICS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT .........................................73 
C. UNITY OF EFFORT .....................................................................................75 
D. THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT....................................76 
E. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT IN COUNTIES ................................................................78 
APPENDIX C. COORDINATION CHALLENGES FOR MAJOR EVENTS 
IN THE SAN MATEO COUNTY OPERATIONAL AREA .................................83 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................83 
B. ASIANA AIRPLANE CRASH .....................................................................83 
1. Summary .............................................................................................83
2. Lessons Learned .................................................................................84
C. SAN BRUNO PIPELINE EXPLOSION ......................................................85 
1. Summary .............................................................................................85
2. Lessons Learned .................................................................................86
D. MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL FLOOD RESPONSE ...................................86 
1. Summary .............................................................................................87
 ix 
2. Lessons Learned .................................................................................87
E. KEY FINDINGS ............................................................................................88 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................88 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT..........................................................................97 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Existing intra-OA emergency response coordination model in the San 
Mateo County OA ..............................................................................................7 
Figure 2. EOC activation levels and operational period sustainability ...........................21 
Figure 3. Color coded geographic map of San Mateo County OA depicting the four 
OES and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System coordination zones taken 
from the Operation Cohesive Capability 2014–2015 exercise plan. ...............34 
Figure 4. Suggested zone EOC model intended for better span of control designed 
for the San Mateo County OA .........................................................................43 
Figure 5. Illustration of zone EOC coordination within an operational area ..................60 
Figure 6. California state mutual aid regions ..................................................................66 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. FEMA HAZUS modeling projections for the Hayward and San Andreas 
Faults ..................................................................................................................3 
Table 2. San Francisco Bay Area local governments and State OES entities and 
EOC activation sustainment capacities ............................................................20 
Table 3. San Mateo County OA jurisdictions details with emergency service 
providers ..........................................................................................................27 
Table 4. San Mateo County OA jurisdictions details with emergency management 
capabilities .......................................................................................................28 
Table 5. Structure of emergency management unit .......................................................79 
Table 6. Specialized emergency management training of top officials* .......................80 
Table 7. Duties beyond emergency management ..........................................................81 
Table 8. Emergency management workforce ................................................................81 
  
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACS  Auxiliary Communications Service 
CAL COP California Common Operating Picture 
CAL EOC California (Web-based) Emergency Operations Center 
CAL FIRE California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection  
CAL OES State of California Office of Emergency Services 
CAP  common alerting protocol 
CERT  community emergency response team 
CHP  California Highway Patrol 
COP  common operating picture 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DOC  Department Operations Center 
DPW  Department of Public Works 
EMA  Emergency Managers Association 
EMAC  emergency management assistance compact 
EMS  Emergency Medical Services 
EOC  emergency operations center 
EOD  explosive ordnance disposal 
EOP  emergency operations plan 
ESC  Emergency Services Council 
ESRI  Environmental Systems Research Institute 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FT  fulltime 
FTE  fulltime employee 
GIS  geographic information systems 
HSD  Homeland Security Division 
HSPD  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
IAEM  International Association of Emergency Managers 
 xvi 
ICS  Incident Command System 
IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 
JIC  joint information center 
JIS  joint information system 
JPA  joint powers agreement 
LAC  local assistance center 
MAC  multiagency coordination 
MACS  multiagency coordination system 
MNS  mass notification system 
MOU  memorandum of understanding 
NCRIC Northern California Regional Intelligence Center 
NEMA National Emergency Management Association 
NGO  non-governmental organization 
NIMS  National Incident Management System 
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NPG  National Preparedness Goal 
NRF  National Response Framework 
OA  operational area 
OASIS  Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards  
OES  Office of Emergency Services 
PG&E  Pacific Gas and Electric Utility Company 
PIO  public information officer 
PSC  public safety communications 
RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services 
REOC  State of California Coastal Region Emergency Operations Center 
SEMS  Standardized Emergency Management System 
SF DEM San Francisco Department of Emergency Management 
SFIA  San Francisco International Airport 
SOC  state operations center 
SWAT  special weapons and tactics team 
UASI  Urban Areas Security Initiative 
 xvii 
WEA  wireless emergency alert 
WebEOC Web-based Emergency Operations Center 
 
 xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The San Francisco Bay Area lies in a highly active seismic zone, heightening the risks of 
catastrophic disasters from earthquakes in the region. The Hayward Fault and the San 
Andreas Fault are two of many faults that run through the San Francisco Bay Area with 
the highest probabilities of triggering earthquakes of significant magnitudes. Earthquakes 
of magnitude 7.0 and above on either fault would be expected to generate violent to 
extreme earthshaking in wide geographic areas of the San Francisco Bay Area region 
with dense populations and high concentrations of critical infrastructure. Devastating 
impacts are anticipated concerning loss of life, displacement of households, damage to 
infrastructure, disruption of essential services, and economic loss in the region.  
The catastrophic scale of impacts will likely overwhelm the abilities of local 
governments to effectively provide emergency response services in the immediate 
aftermath. Initially, local governments, such as counties, cities, townships, and special 
districts within the operational areas (OA), will need to be self-reliant and also depend on 
each other until state and federal assistance are deployed and able to assist.  
The likelihood of a geographically expansive scope of impact will require the 
simultaneous activation of all San Francisco Bay Area OA emergency operations centers 
(EOC) and a multitude of local government EOCs to support emergency response and 
coordination. Extensive and prolonged emergency response service and coordination 
needs will require affected local governments to have substantial resources of trained 
personnel to staff fully activated EOCs for extended periods.  
The existing one-to-one intra-OA emergency response coordination model used 
for all events by the San Mateo County OA and other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area 
and the state of California requires activated OA EOCs to coordinate simultaneously with 
all their activated local governments EOCs. During catastrophic disasters, this 
coordination model leads to unmanageable “span of control” challenges that overwhelm 
activated county-led OA EOCs’ abilities to effectively and simultaneously coordinate 
with the numerous, activated local government EOCs within their respective OAs. 
 xx 
Additionally, local governments typically do not have sufficient trained personnel 
resources to continually staff fully activated EOCs for extended periods. This is a 
challenge for the San Mateo County OA and likely for other OAs in the San Francisco 
Bay Area and beyond. 
The goals of this research is: to highlight the limitations of the existing, one-to-
one intra-OA emergency response coordination model during catastrophic disasters; 
establish a clear need for a more effective alternate model; determine what that alternate 
model could be, including its various elements; and also note key aspects for successful 
adoption and implementation in the San Mateo County OA. An additional objective of 
this research is to determine the portability and applicability of the alternate intra-OA 
emergency response coordination model to other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area.  
An alternate, intra-OA emergency response coordination model that would be 
more effective during catastrophic disasters would need to be multilateral and 
collaborative in design that enables manageable “span of control,” and also addresses 
shortages in trained EOC personnel at local governments. One such model that meets the 
criteria is the zone EOC concept.  
The zone EOC concept involves establishing consolidated EOCs to represent 
geographic zones that encompass multiple local governments within an OA. When 
activated, the zone EOCs would coordinate with an OA EOC on behalf of their 
constituent local governments within each geographic zone and not require separate and 
simultaneous EOC activations for each jurisdiction. The zone EOC concept works within 
the frameworks of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the State of 
California’s Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), and is derived from 
the Incident Command System (ICS), and Multi Agency Coordination System (MACS) 
concepts.  
During the past year, the San Mateo County OA considered and then tested via an 
exercise a preliminary idea of the zone EOC concept, aligning with the established zones 
in the OA used by the county Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the Law 
Enforcement Mutual Aid System. Lessons learned from the exercise highlighted the need 
 xxi 
to determine and fully develop the working details of the zone EOC concept and other 
aspects necessary for successful adoption and implementation in the San Mateo County 
OA. This thesis aims to address this need.  
The San Mateo County OA is part of the San Francisco Bay Area in California 
and encompasses the majority of the San Francisco Peninsula. The San Mateo County 
OA is comprised of 15 cities, five townships, and 31 special districts, and as of 2013, had 
an estimated total population of 739,311.1 The San Mateo County OA serves as a major 
mass-transit corridor for the San Francisco Bay Area and hosts the second largest airport 
in California and a deep-water port.  
Emergency management priorities and the needs in the San Mateo County OA are 
collectively addressed through intra-OA multilateral, collaborative frameworks and 
partnerships with all its local governments via a joint powers and exercise agreement 
(JPA) Emergency Service Council (ESC) and a separate Emergency Managers 
Association (EMA). Local governments within the San Mateo County OA have varying 
degrees of capabilities in emergency management functions. An assessment conducted by 
the author in collaboration with the San Mateo County EMA indicated that most local 
governments in the San Mateo County OA do not have sufficient trained personnel to 
sustain fully activated EOC operations for extended periods. Informal but informed 
estimations conducted as part of this research indicated that this capability gap also 
applies to most local governments in the San Francisco Bay Area.  
The established intra-OA multilateral, collaborative frameworks and partnerships 
in the San Mateo County OA provide strong foundations to ease and support adoption 
and implementation of the zone EOC concept. Some of the key aspects for the zone EOC 
concept to be successfully implemented include: buy-in and support from senior 
leadership and stakeholders, addressing concerns for legal liabilities, potential loss of 
jurisdictional control and authority, cost-sharing and allocation of sustainable funding 
                                                                   
1 County of San Mateo, County of San Mateo 2013–2015 Profile (San Mateo, CA: County of San 
Mateo, 2015), accessed September 19, 2015, https://www.smcgov.org/sites/smcgov.org/files/documents/
files/BudgetProfile_2013_v5_1.pdf, A-44.  
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support, long-term staffing and training-exercise plans, and provision of appropriate 
facilities for the zone EOCs.  
The key elements of the concept of operations for the zone EOC concept include: 
activation and deactivation triggers and thresholds, geographic demarcations of zones 
within an OA, zone EOC facilities, organization and authorities, staffing, and operations. 
The activation and deactivation triggers and thresholds for zone EOCs will need to be 
determined and, preferably, standardized. The zone EOC concept would continue to use 
the north, central, south, and coastal zone demarcations used by the county OES and the 
Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System in the San Mateo County OA. Each zone in the 
OA would need to identify a suitable primary facility and an alternate facility to house 
the zone EOCs, preferably with geographic distancing. The zone EOC organizational 
structure, staffing, position authorities, operations, and functions would conform to 
applicable NIMS, ICS, and SEMS guidelines for EOCs. Staffing for the zone EOCs 
would be primarily sourced from the constituent local governments within each zone.  
The zone EOC concept would enable OA EOCs to more effectively coordinate 
with and support their affected local governments. Their local governments would also be 
able to pool their resources to provide emergency response coordination and support 
services within their jurisdictions via consolidated zone EOCs. Additional benefits of the 
zone EOC concept include efficiency gains via sharing of limited resources among local 
governments, promotion and strengthening of collaborative working relationships across 
local governments, leveraging cost savings through cost sharing and decrease in 
duplicative services and personnel labor costs.  
Based on the zone EOC concept’s alignment with NIMS and SEMS frameworks, 
derivation from standard practices, such as ICS and MACS concepts, and the common 
SEMS based jurisdictional framework for local governments and OAs to coordinate 
emergency activities, the concept should be portable and applicable to other OAs in the 
San Francisco Bay Area and likely beyond  
Accordingly, a recommendation borne out of this research and analysis is for the 
San Mateo County OA to proceed in further developing, and formally adopting, 
 xxiii 
implementing, and institutionalizing the zone EOC concept. A second recommendation is 
to socialize the zone EOC concept and promote portability in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, which would benefit the interests of all OAs in the region and the region as a 
whole.  
Ultimately, the present thesis provides the San Mateo County OA and possibly 
other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond a well-defined, more effective, 
alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination model as a viable solution to address 
a critical capability gap during catastrophic disasters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Indeed one’s faith in one’s plans and methods is truly tested when the 
horizon before one is the blackest. 
– Mahatma Gandhi 
 
The San Francisco Bay Area lies in a highly active seismic zone with numerous 
active and potentially active faults capable of causing earthquakes that would result in 
catastrophic disasters in the region.1 The San Francisco Bay Area has experienced large-
scale earthquakes in recent history, including the magnitude (M) 6.0 August 2014 south 
Napa earthquake and the M 6.9 October 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Previously 
recorded earthquakes that caused significant loss of life and structural damage were the 
M 7.8 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the M 6.8 1896 Hayward earthquake.2  
The threat is real, and the consequences of an earthquake of significant magnitude 
could potentially be devastating for the San Francisco Bay Area. The catastrophic scale 
of impacts from earthquakes of any significant magnitude in the San Francisco Bay Area 
would likely overwhelm the abilities of local governments 3  to effectively provide 
emergency response services in the immediate aftermath and in subsequent days. Local 
governments (counties, cities, townships, and special districts) would require extensive 
state and federal emergency response assistance, which will take time to deploy and 
situate.  
                                                                   
1 California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX, “Bay Area Earthquake Plan” (draft, California 
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Region IX, 2015). 
2 Ibid., B-4, B-5. 
3 According to SEMS Guidelines: Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), “Local 
governments include counties, cities, townships, and special districts. Local governments manage and 
coordinate the overall emergency response and recovery activities within their jurisdiction.” State of 
California, Governor’s Office of Emergency Services [Cal OES], SEMS Guidelines: Standardized 
Emergency Management System), 2009, accessed September 4, 2015, http://www.caloes.ca.gov/
PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/12%20SEMS%20Guidelines%20Complete.pdf, 2.  
 2 
At least initially, local governments would need to rely on their own resources 
and capabilities to provide emergency response services when the needs are greatest, 
immediately after such devastating earthquakes. Any assistance that might be available 
would come first from neighboring jurisdictions that would also be contending with the 
same disaster and emergency response needs but could be better placed to provide 
support more quickly given geographic proximity, and existing intra-operational area 
(OA) governance structures. Instead of post-event, ad-hoc, or snap decisions, pre-event 
formal frameworks and agreements for collaborative multilateral emergency response 
and coordination partnerships between local governments within OAs are needed for 
catastrophic disasters. However, to be effective, these partnerships must be formalized, 
adopted, practiced, and maintained before disasters strike. 
Literature review indicated that a critical evaluation has not been conducted on 
the effectiveness of the existing intra-OA emergency response coordination model that 
will be utilized during catastrophic disasters in the San Mateo County OA and other OAs 
in the San Francisco Bay Area. This author’s informed concerns as a practitioner in a 
senior leadership role overseeing coordination and support of emergency response in the 
San Mateo County OA has motivated this study of the challenges of the existing intra-OA 
emergency response coordination model. The goal of this research is to provide an 
effective, alternate solution (the zone EOC concept) that could be applied to the San 
Mateo County OA as well as other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond.  
A. RISK ASSESSMENT  
The 2015 California Earthquake Authority and the Uniform California 
Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF) 3 report, which provides authoritative details on 
earthquake fault ruptures throughout California, notes that the probabilities for an 
earthquake greater than M 6.7 in the San Francisco Bay Area is highest for the Hayward 
Fault at 14.3 percent, and next highest for the North San Andreas Fault at 6.43 percent.4 
The Hayward and San Andreas Faults, particularly the Hayward Fault, run through 
densely populated urban areas in the San Francisco Bay Area which has high                                                                    
4 Ibid., B-3. 
 3 
concentrations of critical infrastructure, including regional mass transportation corridors, 
as well as gas, electric, fuel, and water utility lines.5 Any earthquakes of significant 
magnitudes on the Hayward or San Andreas Fault are anticipated to have devastating 
effects in terms of loss of life, displacement of households, damage to infrastructure, 
disruption of essential services, and economic loss in the region.6 A snapshot of the 
projected impacts based on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazards 
United States (HAZUS) modeling runs for the M 7.0 Hayward Fault and the M 7.8 San 
Andreas Fault earthquake scenarios are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1.   FEMA HAZUS modeling projections for the Hayward and San 
Andreas Faults7 
 
The San Mateo County OA is especially vulnerable as the San Andreas Fault runs 
north-south through the middle of the OA underlying most of the local governments 
within the OA. The San Mateo County OA is also vulnerable to the neighboring Hayward 
Fault, which runs parallel to the San Andreas Fault, east of the San Francisco Bay. Just 
during the writing of this thesis, the San Francisco Bay Area, including the San Mateo 
County OA experienced two earthquakes, an M 5.0 and an M 4.9 within six months of 
each other.  
                                                                   
5 Ibid., B-4.  
6 Ibid., B-1. 
7 Ibid., B-8. 
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B. PROBLEM SPACE  
Catastrophic earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area will affect wide 
geographic areas and require the simultaneous activation of emergency operations centers 
(EOCs) of all affected local governments to support emergency response and 
coordination. At some level, intra-OA emergency response coordination is already well-
planned. The State of California’s Standardized Emergency Management System 
(SEMS) offers a framework and guidance for emergency management using the Incident 
Command System (ICS). SEMS is the adopted standard that is practiced throughout the 
State of California for field-level response, emergency operations management, and 
mutual aid coordination with OAs, regions, and the state. SEMS clearly defines 
emergency response coordination at the state and regional levels. In addition, it defines 
one-to-one, intra-OA coordination mechanisms between the lead agency for OAs and 
their local governments. County governments are typically the lead agencies for OAs and 
host OA EOCs.8  
Similarly, the State of California’s Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal 
OES) developed the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) to assist OAs in the 
San Francisco Bay Area to coordinate with each other and the Cal OES Coastal Region 
EOC during catastrophic events affecting multiple jurisdictions. According to the San 
Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, Base Plan:  
The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan builds on California’s 
existing Standardized Emergency Management System, through better 
definition of regional components of that system, including coordination 
across disciplines and levels of government, resource sharing, and regional 
decision-making.9  
Catastrophic earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area would meet the threshold 
to trigger implementation of the RECP. The RECP identifies a regional coordination 
group to represent the affected OAs for the coordination of emergency response activities 
in the San Francisco Bay Area. However, the RECP does not address intra-OA level                                                                    
8 Ibid., 7.  
9 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services et al., San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency 
Coordination Plan, Base Plan (Governor’s Office of Emergency Services et al.., 2008), Foreword.  
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multilateral, collaborative, emergency response coordination where there is an identified 
gap with a lack of formal plans or agreements between local governments within OAs. In 
the absence of intra-OA specific multilateral, collaborative, coordination plans, the San 
Mateo County OA, for example has adopted a Joint Powers and Exercise Authority 
agreement (JPA) for local governments within the OA to work together in their 
emergency response efforts.  
At the intra-OA level, activated county-led OA EOCs must effectively coordinate 
simultaneously with all their activated local governments EOCs while operational. 
Affected local governments must sustain fully activated EOCs for extended periods. On 
behalf of OAs, counties must also supplement and assist severely affected local 
governments that are unable to provide emergency response services, including staff 
EOC operations.10 
The need to sustain fully activated EOCs continually for extended periods 
requires local governments to have substantial numbers of trained personnel to staff 
EOCs. Counties also require deeper pools of trained personnel to support the severely 
affected local governments in providing emergency response services, as well as to also 
accommodate the county-led OA EOCs expanded coordination needs for extended 
periods.  
Typically, local governments do not have sufficient trained personnel resources to 
continually staff fully activated EOCs for extended periods. Such is the case for the San 
Mateo County OA, its constituent local governments, and most, if not all, other local 
governments in the San Francisco Bay Area and likely beyond. Some of the smaller local 
governments in the San Mateo County OA do not have the capacities to activate and staff 
EOC operations at full levels for even one operational period and will defer to the county 
for assistance during catastrophic disasters. This is a common circumstance in other OAs 
in the San Francisco Bay Area and also beyond.  
                                                                   
10 Ibid., 30–31, §4. 
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The shortfall in trained EOC personnel resources will be further magnified during 
catastrophic disasters as personnel themselves may be affected and unable to staff EOC 
positions across the affected areas. The existing intra-OA emergency response 
coordination model that requires county-led OA EOCs to coordinate separately and 
simultaneously with the activated EOCs of their constituent local governments will likely 
be overwhelmed due to unmanageable “span of control” challenges.11 Specifically, the 
shortages in trained EOC personnel impede the abilities of affected local governments to 
staff and operate fully activated EOCs for extended periods. Counties will also likely be 
overstretched in their abilities to provide, on behalf of the OA, the needed supplemental 
assistance and support to incapacitated local governments that are unable to fulfill their 
emergency response functions. Additionally, the lack of sufficient trained EOC personnel 
to assist with expanded coordination needs further diminishes the abilities of county-led 
OA EOCs to coordinate effectively with all their constituent local government’s activated 
EOCs.  
The need for trained personnel to staff EOCs at affected local governments is the 
greatest during the immediate aftermath of catastrophic disasters. As described in SEMS, 
affected local governments could be provided with additional trained personnel to staff 
their EOCs through the local, regional, and statewide mutual aid systems, particularly the 
Emergency Managers Mutual Aid (EMMA) System and additionally through the Inter-
State Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).12 However, it takes time to 
deploy and situate the personnel sourced from elsewhere, with additional delays due to 
the likelihood of widespread damage to the local and regional transportation 
infrastructure following catastrophic earthquake disasters. Also, personnel sourced from 
elsewhere would not be familiar with their assigned local governments and would not 
                                                                   
11 Span of control: The number of individuals a supervisor is responsible for, usually expressed as the 
ratio of supervisors to individuals. (Under the NIMS, an appropriate span of control is between 1:3 and 
1:7.). This concept could be extrapolated and applied to jurisdictional entities, as is being done in this 
context. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Incident Command System Training (ICS) (Washington, 
DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008), accessed September 9, 2015, 
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/icsglossary.pdf, 11 [glossary].  
12 State of California, Emergency Management Mutual Aid Plan (Sacramento, CA: State of California, 
2012), Chapter 1, 3–7.  
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have pre-established working relationships with local government personnel, which may 
reduce efficiencies.  
In the San Mateo County OA, smaller jurisdictions would not have the capacity to 
effectively respond to and manage any event of significant consequence, in particular 
catastrophic disasters. They rely heavily on the county for immediate and direct support. 
San Mateo County would be tasked with serving 15 cities, five townships, 31 special 
districts, and 20 unincorporated communities within the OA, as well as fielding mutual 
aid requests from other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area. Figure 1 illustrates part of 
the dynamics of the existing one-to-one, intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model and its disproportionate span of control for the San Mateo County OA.  
 
Figure 1.  Existing intra-OA emergency response coordination model in the 
San Mateo County OA 
The actual span of control challenge is greater than depicted in Figure 1 as the 31 
special districts and 20 unincorporated communities within the San Mateo County OA 
have not been illustrated separately. San Mateo County will likely be overwhelmed in its 
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abilities to effectively coordinate and support all affected local governments within the 
OA immediately after a catastrophic disaster. Other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area 
and beyond will likely face similar challenges as well.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis posits an intra-OA emergency response coordination model that would 
work more effectively than the current model used in the San Mateo County OA during 
catastrophic disasters. The intra-OA emergency response coordination model currently 
used in the San Mateo County OA entails a one-to-one coordination relationship between 
the county-led OA EOC and each of the EOCs of the local governments within the OA. 
The one-to-one coordination model is applied for all emergency response events—
regardless of scale of emergency response needed, the degree of disaster impact, and the 
duration of time EOCs need to remain activated. The application includes catastrophic 
disasters when the San Mateo County led OA EOC and most, if not, all the local 
governments in the OA are likely to simultaneously activate their respective EOCs at the 
highest activation levels that require fully staffed EOCs. The activated EOCs will 
additionally need to operate at fully staffed levels for extended periods.  
This thesis asks: What would an alternate intra-OA emergency response 
coordination model look like and would it also have portability and applicability to other 
OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond?  
D. PURPOSE OF STUDY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The objectives of the research is: to highlight the inadequacies of the existing one-
to-one intra-OA emergency response coordination model during catastrophic disasters; 
establish a clear need for a more effective alternate model; determine what that alternate 
model could be, including its various elements; and also outline key aspects for 
successful adoption and implementation in the San Mateo County OA. Additionally, the 
research determines the portability and applicability of the alternate intra-OA emergency 
response coordination model to other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area. The analysis 
examines existing local government emergency response coordination models to consider 
a new model using a multilateral philosophy of collaborative intra-OA coordination. The 
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outcome of this research aims to provide the San Mateo County OA a well-defined, more 
effective alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination model as a viable solution 
to address a critical capability gap during catastrophic disasters, a time of greatest need. 
The proposed solution also has portability and applicability to other OAs in the San 
Francisco Bay Area and beyond, significantly expanding the contributions of this 
research. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The research draws on primary sources such as after action reports, journals, 
books, manuals, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA documents, State 
of California and San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services (OES) documents, 
annexes, and plans, as well as previously written theses, policy, and procedure manuals, 
and published local, state, and federal government articles.13 The alternate, intra-OA 
emergency response coordination model this thesis advances, which would be more 
effective during catastrophic disasters, owes much to the author’s formal training, 
experience, and practitioner knowledge in the fields of emergency management and law 
enforcement. The author has 29 years invested in the field of law enforcement, 
specifically in the U.S. military and as a special weapons and tactics team (SWAT) 
commander, incident commander, and director of emergency services for the San Mateo 
County OA.  
Several scholarly theories also informed and influenced the author in considering 
an alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination model as a solution to the 
identified gap in effectiveness of the existing intra-OA coordination model during 
catastrophic disasters. Philosophical theories, such as complexity theory, holism, and 
predictable surprise, helped this author recognize the need for more effective intra-OA 
emergency response coordination during catastrophic disasters and inspired him to                                                                    
13 Literature pertaining to frameworks, policies, guidelines, and use of technology tools in emergency 
management is later presented in Appendix A. Appendix B examines the governance structure of local 
emergency management. General assumptions are examined for applicability toward emergency response, 
mitigation and recovery, the importance of cohesive efforts and unity of effort among stakeholders. The 
governance category concludes in Appendix C with an examination of the San Mateo County Operational 
Area as a model for intra-OA zone EOC consideration. 
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challenge the status quo of continuing to rely on the existing one-to-one intra-OA 
coordination model during catastrophic disasters. The theories provide insights that 
inform and support multilateral collaborative solutions for more effective intra-OA 
coordination.  
1. Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory is defined as “the study of complex and chaotic systems and 
how order, pattern, and structure can arise from them.”14  In Science Direct’s 2001 
Leadership Quarterly journal article, Russ Marion authored a study called “Leadership in 
Complex Organizations.” The research argues:  
complexity theory focuses leadership efforts on behaviors that enable 
organizational effectiveness, as opposed to determining or guiding 
effectiveness. Complexity theory is the study of interacting systems; it 
explores the nature of interaction and adaptation in such systems and how 
they influence such things as emergence, innovation, and fitness.15  
Complexity theory has direct correlation and application to the role of emergency 
management during EOC operations. According to Marion and Uhl-Bien, “Complexity 
theory focuses leadership efforts on behaviors that enable organizational effectiveness, as 
opposed to determining or guiding effectiveness.”16 Similar to the nature of emergency 
management, “complexity theorists see nature as too dynamic, unstable and 
unpredictable,”17 as in surprise attacks, acts of nature or catastrophic events. 
Complexity science moves us away from reductionist perspectives that 
reduce holistic systems to isolated observations. Instead, complexity 
theory encourages us to see organizations as complex adaptive systems 
composed of a diversity of agents who interact with one another, mutually 
                                                                   
14 Dictionary.com Unabridged, s.v. “Complexity Theory,” accessed: July 08, 2015, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/complexity theory. 
15 Russ Marion, and Mary Uhl-Bien, “Leadership in Complex Organizations,” The Leadership 
Quarterly 12, no. 4 (2001): 389–418 accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S1048984301000923.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  
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affect one another, and in so doing generate novel behavior for the system 
as a whole18  
This creates a healthy, collaborative work environment. The complexity theory 
supports the argument that a one-to-one intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model is a reductionist minded approach that soon loses efficiency during complex events 
such as catastrophic disasters.  
2. Holism 
The complimenting philosophical view to complexity theory is holism. Holism is 
best described in the context of the research as ideas that: “the whole is more than the 
sum of its constitutive parts, so reduction of the whole to its constitutive elements 
eliminates some factors which are present only when a being is seen as a whole.”19 For 
example, EOCs can interact with other EOCs for the benefit of multiagency cooperation; 
however, they lack the collective bandwidth of sustainability when acting alone in one-
to-one coordination efforts.  
In a similar analogy to the concept of holism, where the theory supports the 
“whole being greater than the sum of its parts,”20 is the 2001 New England Patriots 
football team. The team, led by a rookie quarterback, a newly appointed head coach, and 
a mix of unknown players, won a wildcard playoff game. They followed this with a 
controversial playoff win against the Oakland Raiders (known as the infamous “snow 
bowl”) and beat the reigning Superbowl champion, the St. Louis Rams, in the 2002 
Superbowl.21  The football example demonstrates the concept that the whole can be 
greater than the sum of its individual parts (players). The same concept can be applied in 
crisis response for smaller local governments where the employee pool is already taxed 
by combining with neighboring local governments to create a sum greater than its                                                                    
18 Ibid.  
19 New World Encyclopedia, s.v. “Holism,” accessed July 8 2015, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Holism&oldid=979137.  
20 Ibid.,  
21 Mike Gleason, “The Most Improbable Championship: The 2001 New England Patriots,” Bleacher 
Report, January 8, 2010, accessed September 9, 2015, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/322646-the-most-
improbable-championship-the-2001-new-england-patriots.  
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collective part(s). An alternate, multilateral, collaborative intra-OA coordination model 
would offer the sum of the pool of employees from contributing local governments, 
greatly expanding the collective capacity and capabilities.  
In the book Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Management, M. Jackson 
writes about holism as “systems to be more than the sum of their parts.”22 Jackson 
submits that holism offers benefits from “the failure of reductionism to cope with 
problems of complexity, diversity and change in complex systems.”23 Reductionism will 
not survive in a group setting where knowledge and experience is present and available to 
be shared.  
3. Predictable Surprise  
Max Bazerman and Michael Watkins, in their book, Predictable Surprise: The 
Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, and How to Prevent Them, define predictable 
surprise as “an event or set of events that take an individual or group by surprise, despite 
prior awareness of all of the information necessary to anticipate the events and their 
consequences.”24 In a study conducted on U.S. pensions, the Oxford University Press 
defines predictable surprise as, “a predictable surprise describes a situation or 
circumstance in which avoidable crises are marginalized in order to satisfy economic and 
social policies.”25 In the aftermath of any significant crisis, the usual or inevitable second 
guessers will often imply that the people in leadership positions should have predicted the 
event.  
A recent example of predictable surprise on the part of the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company (PG&E) was its negligent pipeline maintenance practice and 
documentation. The result was the 2010 San Bruno, California (CA) pipeline explosion                                                                    
22 Michael Jackson, Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Management (West Sussex, England: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2003), 4.  
23 Ibid.,  
24 Max Bazerman, and Michael Watkins, Predictable Surprise: The Disasters You Should Have Seen 
Coming, and How to Prevent Them (Boston, MA: Harvard School Publishing Corporation 2008), 1. 
25 Sylvester J. Schieber, The Predictable Surprise: Unraveling the U.S. Retirement System (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).  
 13 
where a “30 inch [in diameter] high pressure natural [gas] pipeline exploded, killing eight 
people”26 and caused over $1 billion in damages to residents, the city, and its own assets. 
The city and news immediately accused PG&E of failing to prevent a predictable 
disaster. Ultimately, the residents and city of San Bruno were awarded millions of dollars 
from PG&E in damages. As if by premonition, professor Phil Tetlock of the University of 
California in Berkeley wisely noted, “events are not simply predictable or unpredictable, 
but rather they are a continuum of predictability,”27 a wise and ominous foretelling for 
the PG&E legal team. 
In most circumstances in life, there are a number of characteristics that can alert 
people to potential predictable surprises lying in wait. Some examples include:  
1. Leaders knew of a problem but took no action to mitigate it.  
2. “Fixing the problem would incur significant costs while benefits may be 
delayed; it is counterintuitive to spend scarce real resources now to 
prevent an ambiguous and merely potential harm from occurring in the 
future.  
3. Measures aimed at avoiding predictable surprises require costs that 
constituencies will notice, yet politicians will not be recognized or 
awarded for the disasters they help to avert. For this reason, they have 
little motivation to work to prevent predictable surprises and may choose 
to cross their fingers and hope for the best.”28  
4. The fourth predictable surprise is “the natural human tendency to maintain 
the status quo: when a system still functions and there is no crisis to 
catalyze action, we will keep doing things the way we have always done 
them.”29  
Acting against the status quo bias goes against the natural flow of things and requires a 
decision that often is marginalized when compared with present day urgent matters.  
Predictable surprise relates to the politics of crisis management and disaster 
planning, often manifesting in the lack of needed preparedness planning for known                                                                    
26 San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services, San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services: 
Post-San Bruno Fire Self-Evaluation, accessed July 8, 2015, https://www.sanmateocourt.org/documents/
grand_jury/2011/emergency_services.pdf, 6.  
27 Ibid., 4. 
28 Ibid., 6 
29 Ibid., 7 
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potential threats. For example, most local governments lack sufficient personnel with 
appropriate training and experience to staff fully activated EOCs for extended periods, 
and yet, measures to address the shortfall are not prioritized and addressed.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In mid-2014, the author, in collaboration with a colleague at the county OES, 
Donald Mattei (who is also a second reader for this thesis), considered the idea of 
establishing consolidated local government EOCs for the San Mateo County OA that 
would align with the established zones already used by the county OES and the Law 
Enforcement Mutual Aid System. The San Mateo County OA is currently demarcated 
into four zones for providing emergency service functions by the county OES: north, 
central, south, and coastal. Also, the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System coordination 
in the San Mateo County OA utilizes the same corresponding zones, along with the OA 
public safety communications dispatch system when coordinating response units for calls 
in progress and for pre-planned events. The county OES has assigned district 
coordinators to each zone to coordinate and oversee emergency services functions, and 
the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System has assigned a coordinator for each zone. 
Additionally, the Public Works Mutual Aid System established within the San Mateo 
County OA also envisions establishing a zone concept that mirrors existing geographic 
zones demarcated for the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System.  
In late 2014 and early 2015, the county OES conducted a zone-based, four-part 
exercise, with tabletop and functional elements, called Operation Cohesive Capability 
(OCC). One of the OCC exercise objectives was to test the preliminary concept of zone-
based consolidated local government EOCs, focusing on EOC coordination, emergency 
communications, public-private partnership coordination, and use of mass notification 
systems. Although the concept at the time was still at a very high level and the working 
details and various conceptual elements had yet to be developed, the idea was to explore 
the feasibility and potential viability as well as to ascertain stakeholder interest in the 
concept.  
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Each of the OCC exercise series was designed to address an existing vulnerability 
in each pre-established county OES zone that also corresponded with the Law 
Enforcement Mutual Aid System coordination zone. Exercise scenarios were assigned as 
follows:  
• North zone: mass transportation disruption with hazardous materials 
release; lead agencies were fire services, environmental health and public 
health;  
• Central zone: utility disruption; lead agencies were Department of Public 
Works (DPW), law enforcement, and fire services;  
• South zone: Active and mobile criminal threat; lead agencies were law 
enforcement, including explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and fire 
services;  
• Coastal zone: Wild land fire; lead agencies were the California 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), DPW, and 
California Highway Patrol (CHP).  
Each scenario was designed to overwhelm the capacity of a single jurisdiction’s response 
requiring intra-OA mutual aid support.  
As part of the OCC exercise, local governments within each county OES/Law 
Enforcement Mutual Aid System coordination zone in the San Mateo County OA agreed 
to combine resources and staffing into consolidated EOCs for their respective zones. 
Each OCC exercise series was conducted one month apart from each other, allowing time 
for planning, exercise play, and after action reporting before the next series. All 
jurisdictions were invited to participate, observe, evaluate, or assist in any exercise series 
with the agreement that the designated zone agencies would lead their respective 
exercises. The OCC exercise series target audiences were city managers, police and fire 
chiefs, department heads, law enforcement commanders, and emergency managers from 
all jurisdictions within the San Mateo County OA. Supporting branches and unit roles 
were also included from Human Services Agency, American Red Cross, County Parks, 
Animal Control, community emergency response teams (CERT), information technology 
services, finance, purchasing, private sector, non-governmental organizations, etc.  
The OCC exercises were successful in that they confirmed feasibility and 
potential viability of the preliminary idea of zone-based consolidated local government 
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EOCs. Importantly, a majority of the local governments who participated in the OCC 
exercises were supportive of exploring the concept of consolidating local government 
EOCs by zones within the OA. Additional successes of the OCC exercises are that they 
provided opportunities for senior leadership and staff from various local governments in 
the OA to establish new working relationships, train together, and collaboratively 
problem solve the exercise scenario challenges. Also, the OCC exercises allowed local 
governments within the OA to learn that a significant majority of them were willing to 
work together and valued opportunities for partnerships.  
The OCC exercises also revealed failures that informed lessons learned that in 
turn highlighted the need to determine and fully develop the specifics of the zone-based 
consolidated local government EOCs concept. The working details of the concept that 
need further development include legal and operational framework and design, concept of 
operations, associated legal agreements, policies, procedures, protocols, funding and 
staffing needs, and other aspects necessary for successful adoption and implementation in 
the San Mateo County OA. This thesis addresses the highlighted needs and provides a 
solid foundation to assist the San Mateo County OA in developing and implementing the 
zone-based consolidated local government EOCs concept.  
G. THESIS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides foundational information on capacity and capability gaps of 
local, regional, state, and federal governments in the context of the San Francisco Bay 
Area sustaining EOC activations. The chapter also provides an overview of the San 
Mateo County OA and its constituent local governments in the context of emergency 
management functions, frameworks, agreements, partnerships, and capabilities.  
Chapter III introduces an alternate, intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model, which would be more effective during catastrophic disasters in the context of the 
San Mateo County OA. The chapter details the various elements of the model providing 
an overview of what the model looks like and the working details to operationalize it.  
Chapter IV discusses key aspects for successful adoption and implementation of 
an alternate, intra-OA emergency response coordination model in the San Mateo County 
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OA. The chapter also examines the portability and applicability of the alternate model in 
other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and possibly beyond.  
Chapter V provides recommendations and conclusions that are informed by the 
thesis research and analysis on an alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model that would be more effective during catastrophic disasters in the San Mateo 
County OA, in other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area, and possibly beyond.  
Appendix A discusses emergency management frameworks, policies, and 
guidelines for response to complex events, including catastrophic disasters. 
Technological tools that assist with situational awareness and promote a common 
operating picture are also discussed in the context of their usefulness for emergency 
response coordination.  
Appendix B provides further insights to additional challenges in emergency 
management and capability gaps, highlighting the politics of crisis management that 
contribute to decision making, the importance in unity of effort between and among 
agencies and local governments, the overall role of emergency management, and the 
status of organization and structure of emergency management in counties.  
Finally, Appendix C identifies coordination challenges in major events that 
occurred in the San Mateo County OA. Case studies are presented and discussed 
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II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EOC STAFFING CAPABILITIES 
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE SAN MATEO COUNTY 
OPERATIONAL AREA 
There is no greater necessity than to collaborate on a regional basis to 
leverage expertise, share specialized assets, enhance capacity, and 
interoperate cohesively and effectively. 
– U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  
National Preparedness Guidance 
 
This chapter assesses the capacities of local governments in the San Francisco 
Bay Area to staff EOC operations and highlights gaps in their capabilities. Additionally, 
this chapter also provides an overview of the San Mateo County OA and its constituent 
local governments in the context of emergency management functions, frameworks, 
agreements, partnerships, and capabilities. 
A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EOC STAFFING CAPABILITIES 
For this research, informal but informed estimations of the existing capabilities of 
local governments and OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area, and state and federal entities 
to sustain fully activated EOC operations for extended periods were developed and 
analyzed. The estimations are based on reviews of San Francisco Bay Area OA 
emergency managers’ plans, local governments’ contingency plans, and the author’s 
years of relevant training, experience, and practitioner knowledge. The estimations 
highlight a critical capability gap at local government levels to sustain fully activated 
EOC operations for extended periods, as would be needed in catastrophic disasters. The 
capability gap significantly impedes the abilities of local governments to effectively 
support coordination of emergency response efforts during catastrophic disasters.  
EOC activation levels and procedures can be scaled to correspond to the changing 
emergency response needs to events. The chief executive, usually a city or county 
manager or designee, decides the level of activation needed to support field operations or 
other activated department operations centers (DOC) or EOCs. For the purposes of the 
dataset presented in Table 2, an EOC activation level is defined in terms of an 
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organization’s EOC activation sustainment capacity for multiple operational periods 
during an extended incident, emergency, or disaster. The county-led OA EOC, dependent 
on the need, may activate to Level 1 (duty officer status), Level 2 (duty officer in addition 
to affected department or agency representatives) or Level 3 (full activation of all EOC 
branches and required section chief positions) to support local governments within its OA 
boundaries. Table 2 depicts the EOC activation sustainment capacities of most San 
Francisco Bay Area local governments, categorized by jurisdiction type and population 
size, and the state OES entities.  
Table 2.   San Francisco Bay Area local governments and State OES entities 
and EOC activation sustainment capacities 
Jurisdiction Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 2+ Operational Periods 
Township/City – Population ≤ 10,000 Yes Yes No No 
Township – Population ≤ 25,000 Yes Yes No No 
Small City – Population ≥ +25,000 Yes Yes No No 
Medium City – population ≥ 50,000 Yes Yes Yes No 
Large City – Population ≥ 100,000 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Operational Areas Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cal OES Coastal Region EOC Yes Yes* Yes* Yes* 
State Operations Center Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* The Cal OES Coastal Region EOC is currently not staffed by full time employees and would have to 
source personnel from other Cal OES regions or Cal OES headquarters if it needed to be fully activated. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the EOC activation sustainment capacities of the various levels 
of governments within the San Francisco Bay Area: local, OA, Cal OES Coastal Region 
Regional EOC (REOC), Cal OES Headquarters State Operations Center (SOC), and 
federal support. The y-axis in Figure 2 represents an EOC activation level while the x-
axis represents the duration of event broken into 12-hour operational periods. The graph 
highlights the point that some jurisdictions have sufficient trained EOC staff to sustain a 
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fully activated EOC (level 3) for extended periods, while others do not have the 
bandwidth to staff or stay operational without additional trained EOC personnel support.  
Typically, under the SEMS framework, the Cal OES Coastal Region REOC 
should be activated when a county-led OA EOC in the Cal OES Coastal Region is 
activated; the San Mateo County OA and the San Francisco Bay Area falls within Cal 
OES Coastal Region’s jurisdiction. However, the Cal OES Coastal Region REOC does 
not activate when county-led OA EOCs are activated at any levels to support OAs in the 
Cal OES Coastal Region jurisdiction. The state presently relies on its SOC activation to 
accommodate the Cal OES Coastal Region REOC’s absence. Federal resources are not 
applicable unless the SOC is fully activated and requests mutual aid assistance.  
 
Figure 2.  EOC activation levels and operational period sustainability 
*The horizontal line at the bottom of the graph reflects the present operational capacity of the Cal OES 
Coastal Region REOC due to inadequate assigned personnel and lack of facilities and technology tools 
to support EOC activations.  
 
Local governments in the San Francisco Bay Area can easily assess their own 
capabilities and align themselves on the Figure 2 graph to determine if they are creating 
or more likely perpetuating a predictable surprise for themselves in the event they are 
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required to fully activate and sustain their EOCs during a catastrophic disaster. Local 
jurisdictions, especially those with populations less than 50,000 or so, are likely to be 
quickly overwhelmed when responding to and managing complex incidents, 
emergencies, or disasters. As reflected by the informal but informed data in Table 2 and 
Figure 2, most local jurisdictions in the San Francisco Bay Area typically do not have 
sufficient trained EOC personnel to sustain fully activated EOC operations for extended 
periods.  
The threat of a catastrophic earthquake is ever present in the San Francisco Bay 
Area. Appropriate preparedness measures in response to such risks and its challenges 
should be undertaken in an effort to better prepare for more effective and successful 
outcomes in the event of a catastrophe.  
B. OVERVIEW: THE SAN MATEO COUNTY OPERATIONAL AREA 
The San Mateo County OA consists of the political subdivisions that are within 
the geographic boundaries of the county of San Mateo. San Mateo County lies in the 
western coast of the state of California, encompassing the majority of the San Francisco 
Peninsula in the San Francisco Bay Area. As noted in the San Mateo County Emergency 
Operations Plan (EOP): 
The county is bordered by the City and County of San Francisco on the 
north, the counties of Santa Clara and Santa Cruz on the south, the Pacific 
Ocean on the west, and the San Francisco Bay on the east.30  
The Santa Cruz mountain range separates the coastside of the county from the bayside 
along the central axis of the county.  
San Mateo County has a total area of 741 square miles, of which 449 square miles 
are land and 292 square miles are water.31 As of 2013, the estimated total population in 
the county was approximately 747,373.32 The majority of the population, approximately                                                                    
30 San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, San Mateo County Hazard Vulnerability Assessment Annex to 




91 percent reside in 20 incorporated cities, and the remaining residents live in 
unincorporated communities and areas.33 The county hosts the second largest airport in 
California, the San Francisco International Airport, and is also home to the Port of 
Redwood City, which is the only deep-water port servicing the southern part of the San 
Francisco Bay.34 The county also serves as a major mass transit corridor for the San 
Francisco Bay Area linking the city and county of San Francisco with Silicon Valley and 
the San Francisco Peninsula with the East Bay with a network of roads and railway 
lines.35  
The county manager is the director of emergency services, as identified in the San 
Mateo County EOP; however, he/she assigns emergency management and oversight 
responsibilities to the elected sheriff as his/her designee. 36  In August 2012, a new 
Homeland Security Division and Area Office of Emergency Services (HSD/OES) was 
created within the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office. It is comprised of bureaus that 
focus all aspects of emergency management for all hazards. The county OES coordinates 
emergency management responsibilities through its four district coordinators, each 
assigned to pre-established geographic zones: north, central, south, and coastal.  
The San Mateo County OA has established an Emergency Services Council 
(ESC) through a joint powers and exercise agreement/authority (JPA) with cities and 
townships within the OA. The JPA was formalized under the Joint Exercise of Powers 
Act, California Government Code, § 6500 et seq.37 The JPA’s core mission and purpose 
is “to operate pursuant to Presidential Directive 5, the National Response Framework, 
NIMS, Presidential Directive 8, the National Preparedness Goal,”38 SEMS, and local                                                                    
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
36 San Mateo Sheriff’s Office Homeland Security Division, Office of Emergency Services, Emergency 
Operations Plan (San Mateo, CA: San Mateo Sheriff’s Office Homeland Security Division, Office of 
Emergency Services, 2015).   
37 San Mateo Office of Emergency Services, and Emergency Managers Association, San Mateo 
County Joint Powers Agreement, October 2013, http://192.237.168.44/sites/default/files/downloadables/
October%2017%2C%202014%20JPA.pdf.  
38 Ibid.  
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adopted Emergency Operations Plans and Annexes. Section 1.04 of the San Mateo 
County Emergency Services Council JPA, states:  
Participation in the Organization is intended to ensure cooperative 
emergency planning and response; all participating Member Agencies and 
partners are expected to attend all regular and special meetings of the 
Emergency Services Council, encouraged to active participation by their 
jurisdictions in the development of plans and training programs, drills, 
exercises and training opportunities, and otherwise assist in supporting the 
implementation of this agreement.39  
The director of the HSD/OES reports to the ESC and manages the San Mateo County 
Emergency Services Council JPA comprised of elected representatives from each of the 
incorporated cities, the county, and townships, for the purpose of maintaining a unified 
emergency management organization.  
The San Mateo County OA also has 31 special districts. Some special districts 
have active roles during emergencies, such as the fire protection districts, which often act 
as operations chiefs, planning chiefs, or incident commanders or make decisions on 
behalf of city and township managers. Other special districts, such as the school districts, 
mosquito and vector control district, harbor district, etc., have a lesser role during 
emergencies unless there is a specific nexus to their discipline. Some districts send 
representatives to an activated EOC while some do not, depending on the location and 
geographic area of impact of the incident, emergency, or disaster, and how it affects them 
as stakeholders in the OA. Special districts are not contributing member agencies in the 
San Mateo County Emergency Services Council JPA and have no voting rights. 
The San Mateo County OA has also established a Public Works Mutual Aid 
System through a formal memorandum of understanding (MOU) between all cities and 
their departments of public works to share resources on a voluntary basis during disasters. 
The Public Works Mutual Aid System emulates the other existing discipline-specific 
mutual aid systems; however, it is a voluntary system and not automatic. Additionally, 
the language of the MOU and its accompanying procedures guide specifically envision 
                                                                   
39 Ibid., 12.   
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establishing a “zone” concept of aid that mirrors existing geographic zones demarcated 
for the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System.40  
The San Mateo County OA also has an Emergency Managers Association (EMA) 
for the purpose of supporting OA wide emergency management needs. The San Mateo 
County EMA comprises of emergency managers or representatives from cities, 
townships, county departments, special districts, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) within the San Mateo County OA. The collaborative multiagency and multi-
jurisdictional, OA-wide partnership through the San Mateo County EMA assists in 
collectively identifying emergency management capability gaps and needs and then 
developing strategies and implementation plans for programs and processes to address 
the identified gaps and needs in the San Mateo County OA. In addition, the San Mateo 
County EMA meets monthly to ensure that the county’s provision of emergency 
management functions addresses the needs of local governments within the OA.  
As part of this research, the author conducted an assessment in collaboration with 
members of the San Mateo County EMA to provide an overview of the cities and 
townships in the San Mateo County OA and their existing emergency management 
capabilities. The assessment data is presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents an 
overview of the all the cities and townships in the San Mateo County OA and details their 
total populations, geographic areas, and service providers for key emergency 
management functions. Table 4 provides an overview of all the cities and townships in 
the San Mateo County OA and an estimation of their existing emergency management 
capabilities reflected through the number of trained personnel assigned for emergency 
management functions, and their capacities to sustain EOC activations at various levels 
and for extended periods.  
 
 
                                                                   
40 County of San Mateo Public Works, County of San Mateo Public Works Mutual Aid Agreement, 
accessed September 19, 2015, http://192.237.168.44/sites/default/files/downloadables/public%20works.pdf.  
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In essence, the Table 4 data provides an overview of the levels of commitment by 
cities and townships in San Mateo County OA to emergency management functions and 
highlights the potential capability gaps. The data in Table 4 shows that most cities and 
townships in the San Mateo County OA do not have a fulltime, dedicated emergency 
manager. In fact, most cities and townships in the San Mateo County OA share 
emergency managers between two or more jurisdictions, causing challenges for the 
emergency manager to focus on one city’s needs over another.  
Cities and townships in the San Mateo County OA also indicate disparities among 
assigned EOC personnel and trained employees in emergency management. The number 
of personnel recommended to staff an EOC should support the key ICS command staff 
and general positions of operations, planning, logistics, finance/administration and EOC 
director. Additionally, staffing for supporting positions would include, a policy group 
representative, unit leaders, web EOC support, logistics support, intelligence, legal 
counsel, liaison, etc., and would require additional staffing. However, the data indicates 
that most cities and townships do not have sufficient trained personnel to staff these 
respective positions in an EOC activated at Level 2 or higher. The data in Table 4 
confirms that most cities and townships in the San Mateo County OA do not have the 
capacities to sustain fully activated EOCs for extended periods.  
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Table 3.   San Mateo County OA jurisdictions details with emergency service providers 
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III. THE ZONE EOC CONCEPT 
Let our advance worrying become advance thinking and planning. 
– Winston Churchill 
 
The intra-OA emergency response coordination model with a one-to-one 
coordination relationship between county-led OA EOCs and each of their local 
governments EOCs is typically the standard practice in the San Francisco Bay Area, the 
state of California, and beyond. There is a lack of alternate, intra-OA emergency response 
coordination model concepts that would be more effective during catastrophic disasters.  
An alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination model would need to be 
multilateral and collaborative in design to be more effective during catastrophic disasters. 
A multilateral and collaborative design would be necessary to address the unmanageable 
“span of control” challenges faced by county-led OA EOCs and the shortage of sufficient 
trained EOC personnel to staff fully activated EOCs for extended periods at the local 
government level.  
This chapter identifies an alternate multilateral collaborative intra-OA emergency 
response coordination model for the San Mateo County OA that would be more effective 
during catastrophic disasters and also outlines the key elements of that alternative model. 
A zone EOC concept can provide an alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model that is multilateral, collaborative, and designed to enable manageable “span of 
control” with reduced overall trained EOC personnel staffing needs. A zone EOC concept 
involves establishing zone-based consolidated local government EOCs to represent 
geographic zones that encompass multiple local governments within an OA. When 
activated, the zone EOCs would coordinate with a county-led OA EOC on behalf of their 
constituent members within each zone, versus each city jurisdiction, township, and 
special district having its separate EOC.  
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A. LEGAL VALIDITY 
The zone EOC concept should fall within the DHS FEMA National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and SEMS frameworks as it is derived from the Incident 
Command System (ICS) and Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) concepts. The 
central feature of the zone EOC concept is that it calls for increased multilateralism and 
collaboration in coordination and sharing of resources between local governments within 
OAs. The zone EOC organizational structure, staffing, and position authorities and 
functions would also conform to applicable NIMS, ICS and SEMS guidelines for EOCs. 
The SEMS framework has a total of five organization levels for coordinating 
emergency activities that progress from field response, local government, OA, region, 
and the state.41  The local government level includes counties, cities, townships, and 
special districts. An OA is a SEMS organization level designation used for coordination 
of emergency activities within a county between all political subdivisions within the 
county geographic area.42 The OA organization level also serves as a coordination link 
with the regional level, which represents the state.43 The zone EOC concept facilitates a 
multilateral collaborative coordination mechanism for local government level entities to 
collectively coordinate emergency services within their jurisdictions, while maintaining 
the SEMS organizational level hierarchy of coordination between local governments and 
their respective OAs and the SEMS functions of local governments and OAs.  
Additionally, the zone EOC concept aligns with the California Code of 
Regulations, § 2408, which states “local government shall use multiagency or inter-
agency coordination to facilitate decisions for overall local government level emergency 
response.”44 Importantly, SEMS provides the framework for various agencies to work 
                                                                   
41 Cal OES, SEMS Guidelines, 8.  
42 Ibid., 7. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. See also James Asche, Development of a Regional Emergency Operations Center for the San 
Mateo County Coast. May 2001 (Half Moon Bay, CA: Half Moon Bay Fire Protection District, 2001), 8. 
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together while continuing to retain their jurisdictional authority, responsibilities, and 
accountability.45  
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The concept of operations discusses the various elements involved in the 
implementation of the zone EOC concept within an OA in response to catastrophic 
disasters. The respective elements include activation, zone demarcations, zone EOC 
facilities, organization and authorities, staffing, operations, joint information centers 
(JICs)/joint information systems (JISs), situational awareness tools, and deactivation.  
1. Activation 
New policies can clarify when the zone EOCs would be activated and deactivated 
with clearly defined thresholds. The most appropriate scenario to activate the zone EOC 
concept would be following a catastrophic disaster, such as a catastrophic earthquake, 
that impacts the entire OA.  
Additionally, emergencies or disasters that impact multiple local governments in 
more than one zone but not in all zones in an OA may also be appropriate thresholds to 
activate the zone EOCs. Activating zone EOCs in zones that have not been directly 
affected to support other zones that have been significantly affected would be helpful for 
streamlining management of mutual aid request and fulfillment that county-led OA EOCs 
are responsible for within an OA. In such instances, a county-led OA EOC can coordinate 
mutual aid resource request and fulfillment that a county-led OA EOC is responsible for 
at the zone levels via the zone EOCs versus separately with individual local governments.  
A standardized policy for activation of the zone EOCs across the OA zones is 
preferable and should call for the activation of all zone EOCs following a catastrophic 
disaster impacting the entire OA. However, emergencies or disasters do not always 
impact the entire OA or do impact the entire OA but to varying degrees in the different 
zones. Accordingly, the zone EOC concept should be scalable by allowing flexibility for 
                                                                   
45 Cal OES, SEMS Guidelines, Chapter 1, 6.  
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the local governments within each zone to collectively decide and formally agree upon 
their respective zone EOC activation triggers and thresholds. Selective zone EOC 
activation options for flexible scalability will make the zone EOC concept more resilient 
in application. Policy decisions would determine the various activation levels and trigger 
criteria for degrees of zone EOC activations, preferably with common standards that 
apply to all zone EOCs within an OA.  
2. Zone Demarcations 
The zone EOC concept would continue to use the county OES and the Law 
Enforcement Mutual Aid System coordination zone demarcations of the San Mateo 
County OA into north, central, south and coastal zones for providing emergency service 
functions. The constituent cities, townships, special districts, and unincorporated area 
communities within each of the zones in the OA are as follows: 
 North zone: City of Daly City, City of Brisbane, Town of Colma, City of South 
San Francisco, City of San Bruno, City of Pacifica, Bayshore Sanitary District, 
Broadmoor Police Protection District, Colma Fire Protection District, North Coast 
County Water District, California Water Service - South San Francisco District, North 
San Mateo County Sanitation District, San Mateo County Harbor District, Westborough 
Water District, Guadalupe Valley Municipal Improvement District, Peninsula Health 
Care District, San Mateo County Mosquito and Vector Control District, and the 
unincorporated area communities of Broadmoor and Burlingame Hills. 
 Central zone: City of Millbrae, City of Burlingame, Town of Hillsborough, City 
of San Mateo, City of Foster City, the City of Belmont, California Water Service - Mid-
Peninsula District, Mid-Peninsula Water District, Peninsula Health Care District, Sequoia 
Healthcare District, San Mateo County Mosquito and Vector Control District, and the 
San Francisco International Airport. 
 South zone: the City of San Carlos, City of Redwood City, City of Menlo Park, 
City of East Palo Alto, Town of Atherton, Town of Woodside, Town of Portola Valley, 
Menlo Park Fire Protection District, Ladera Recreation District, Mid-peninsula Regional 
Open Space District, California Water Service - Bear Gulch District, West Bay Sanitary 
District, Woodside Fire Protection District, Atherton Channel Drainage District, East 
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Palo Alto Sanitary District, Sequoia Healthcare District, San Mateo County Mosquito and 
Vector Control District, and the unincorporated area communities of Devonshire, 
Emerald Lake Hills, Ladera, Menlo Oaks, North Fair Oaks, Palomar Park, and West 
Menlo Park. 
 Coastal zone: the City of Half Moon Bay, Coastside Fire Protection District, 
Coastside County Water District, Granada Community Services District, Highlands 
Recreation District, Mid-peninsula Regional Open Space District, Montara Water and 
Sanitary District, San Mateo County Harbor District, Sewer Authority Mid-coastside, San 
Mateo County Mosquito and Vector Control District, San Mateo County Resource 
Conservation District, and the unincorporated area communities of El Granada, 
Highlands-Bay Wood Park, Kings Mountain, La Honda, Loma Mar, Montara, Moss 
Beach, Pescadero, Princeton-by-the-Sea, San Gregorio, and Sky Londa. 
The San Mateo County Harbor District, the Mid-peninsula Regional Open Space 
District, San Mateo County Mosquito and Vector Control District, the Sequoia 
Healthcare District, and the Peninsula Health Care District, have jurisdictional boundaries 
and/or facilities in more than one zone and would be part of the zones they fall in. 
Policies and protocols will determine the respective districts to either participate in one or 
more zone EOCs, when multiple applicable zone EOCs are activated. Unincorporated 
areas that fall within each of the zones are under the county’s jurisdiction and are 
represented by the county-led OA EOC. 
Figure 3 presents the geographic boundaries of the four zones in the San Mateo 
County OA defined by the existing county OES and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid 




Figure 3.  Color coded geographic map of San Mateo County OA depicting 
the four OES and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System coordination 
zones taken from the Operation Cohesive Capability 2014–2015 exercise 
plan.46 
3. Zone EOC Facilities 
Each zone in the OA would need to identify a suitable primary facility and an 
alternate facility to house the zone EOCs, preferably with some distance to minimize the 
likelihood of both facilities being simultaneously compromised during an emergency or 
disaster. The proposed primary and alternate zone EOC facilities should meet and address 
the requirements of FEMA’s EOC assessment checklist, which assists state and local                                                                    
46 Chris Floyd, “Operation Cohesive Capability” (presented at San Mateo County City Managers 
meeting, San Mateo, CA, September 2015), 7.  
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government in performing initial assessments of the hazards, vulnerabilities, and resultant 
risk to their EOCs. 47  Applicable guidelines, which primarily focus on flexibility, 
sustainability, security, survivability, and interoperability, for the design and criteria of 
EOCs should be considered when selecting the zone EOC facilities.48  
4. Organization and Authorities 
The zone EOC organizational structure, staffing, and position authorities and 
functions would conform to applicable NIMS, ICS and SEMS guidelines for EOCs. The 
policy groups in the zone EOCs would be represented by each of the local governments 
within each zone. The policy groups could additionally function as multiagency 
coordination (MAC) groups for their respective zones. 
When the zone EOCs are activated, the county-led OA EOC Policy Group could 
expand and also incorporate the functions and operational guidelines of a MAC group. A 
policy decision will need to be made before a disaster as to whether the expanded county-
led OA EOC Policy Group should include senior representatives from each of the local 
governments, or only designated representatives of each zone in the OA. The local 
governments in each zone will have to collectively make a policy decision beforehand to 
either opt to designate their respective zone representatives or to have their own city 
jurisdiction, township, or special district representatives for the expanded county-led OA 
EOC Policy Group. Given this may be a politically sensitive decision, it would be 
prudent to allow for either option.  
However, if all the local governments in all zones were to opt for independent 
representations, the expanded county-led OA EOC Policy Group size may become 
unwieldy and not conducive for efficient decision making. While the expanded county-
led OA EOC Policy Group should strive for consensus based decision making, it is 
                                                                   
47 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Operations Center Assessment Checklist 




important to note that, in accordance with existing policies, the county representatives in 
the policy group would retain the authority to make final decisions on behalf of the OA.  
To achieve effectiveness of the zone EOC concept, the local governments within 
a zone should establish collective zone-based Mutual Aid agreements. This will enable 
zone EOCs to source needed resources from local governments within their zones via the 
zone-based mutual aid agreements. The zone EOC concept would respect and work 
within the established frameworks for discipline-specific mutual aid systems, such as: fire 
and rescue, law enforcement and coroner /medical examiner, and medical and health 
disciplines. The zone EOCs would also work within the framework of the Public Works 
Mutual Aid System that is specific to the San Mateo County OA and voluntary based. If 
and when resources needed outside of the discipline-specific, mutual aid systems cannot 
be fulfilled from within local governments within a zone, zone EOCs would forward a 
resource request to the county-led OA EOC. 
The zone EOCs would need to establish mechanisms to be aware and informed of 
discipline-specific mutual aid system requests and fulfillment status pertaining to local 
governments within their zones. The recommended mechanisms could be facilitated and 
assisted by representatives of fire and rescue, law enforcement and coroner/medical 
examiner, medical and health, and public works disciplines at the zone EOCs.  
Prioritization decisions for resource deployment and other pertinent decisions 
within zones would be made by the zone EOCs and informed by their policy groups. It is 
recommended that criteria for prioritization be pre-determined and clearly defined as best 
as possible to avoid conflict during zone EOC activations. In the event any zone EOC 
policy groups are unable to reach consensus on resource deployment prioritization, a 
policy should be instituted in advance whereby the county-led OA EOC Policy Group 
would make decisions on their behalf.  
Considerations should be made to assign legal counsel assistance at each activated 
zone EOC and the county-led OA EOC or alternatively provide reliable remote access to 
legal counsel. Assistance will be needed to facilitate decision making on matters with 
legal aspects. Time is of the essence during operational periods at activated EOCs; the 
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timely availability of legal counsel may be needed and would prove helpful. The need for 
legal counsel, particularly at the zone EOCs, will likely be higher during the early phases 
of implementing and institutionalizing the zone EOC concept.  
5. Staffing 
Staffing for the zone EOCs will be primarily sourced from the constituent local 
governments within each zone. Personnel from local governments who are otherwise 
assigned to their respective EOCs are ideal to staff their respective zone EOCs, when 
activated. Each local government should currently have sufficient trained personnel to 
staff at least one operational period of a fully activated EOC. This would provide a 
deeper collective pool of trained EOC personnel from jurisdictions within each zone to 
staff their respective zone EOCs.  
Because the primary activation thresholds for zone EOCs are catastrophic 
disasters, which will require emergency response coordination support for an extended 
period, trained personnel will need to staff the zone EOCs for that prolonged time. 
However, some of the trained personnel may not be able to staff the zone EOCs due to 
impacts on themselves or their families during disasters. Ideally, staffing plans for each 
zone EOC position should consider having three designated trained EOC staff; two 
individuals as primary designees and one as an alternate. The alternate staff member 
would cover a shift in instances where either of the two primary designees are unable to 
do so,49 which would enable a zone EOC to have alternates for each position to staff 24-
hour operations.50 Accordingly, it will be necessary to expand the pool of personnel to 
staff the zone EOCs by providing appropriate training and exercise. Also, if needed, the 
county-led OA EOC can assist in sourcing trained personnel via the state through the 
EMMA system to staff the zone EOCs. However, the period to deploy and situate the 
personnel sourced through EMMA should also be considered.  
                                                                   
49 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services et al., San Francisco Bay Area Regional, 2, §5. 
50 Ibid., 2, §5.  
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Credentialing for zone EOC staffing will require prioritization as personnel will 
be sourced from an array of local governments and possibly from throughout the state via 
the EMMA system. Activated zone EOCs will also be operational for extended periods, 
increasing the need for effective verification of identity and training credentials. 
6. Operations 
The zone EOC operations and functions would conform to applicable NIMS, ICS, 
and SEMS guidelines for EOCs. Additionally, the zone EOC operations would function 
on behalf of all constituent local governments that opt to participate. Resource requests 
from the zone EOCs to the county-led OA EOC and fulfillment of resource request from 
the county-led OA EOC would also be on behalf of each zone representing its constituent 
jurisdictions.  
As per SEMS, EOCs do not directly manage or command incidents but provide 
coordination and response support.51 The field level has command and tactical control of 
response to incidents in the field; field level operations are usually conducted via incident 
command posts (ICPs).52 Accordingly, successful implementation of zone EOCs will 
require local governments to activate their first responder agency DOCs, such as law 
enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, and additionally public works 
DOCs. Zone EOCs will enable continued local government jurisdictional support and 
control of field-level response within their respective jurisdictions via direct coordination 
between their agency DOCs and established ICPs. The activated DOCs of local 
government agencies would then coordinate with the zone EOCs. If one or more area 
commands or unified area commands are established to coordinate with multiple ICPs, 
they would coordinate with the zone EOCs.  
The zone EOCs will need to have the capability and capacity to manage and 
coordinate with the county-led OA EOC and activated DOCs of local government 
agencies. The county should provide liaisons for each activated zone EOC to assist 
                                                                   
51 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Operations Center, 3. 
52 Ibid. 
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coordination with the county-led OA EOC. The county liaisons at the zone EOCs could 
be either the designated county OES district coordinators, who are assigned to zones they 
oversee, or other county personnel knowledgeable about the zones they are assigned to. 
In addition to having a senior representative at the policy group at its respective zone 
EOC, each constituent local government should also consider having a field-operational 
level liaison at its respective zone EOC to assist with coordination with their activated 
DOCs and other local government entities.  
Ensuring interoperable communications between the zone EOCs and their local 
government DOCs is important. The county’s continued efforts to integrate the 
communications systems of all local governments with the county’s newly deployed P25 
radio system will prove valuable in enabling interoperable communications between the 
zone EOCs, DOCs, and the county-led OA EOC. Additionally, it will be necessary to 
establish clear communications protocols for zone EOCs to identify and track 
communications from the DOCs from various local governments within their respective 
zones.  
A newly established communications unit will operate within the logistics 
sections of the zone EOCs to support communications needs between the numerous 
activated local government DOCs, the zone EOCs, and the county-led OA EOC. 
Additionally, the installation and use of dispatch consoles at the zone EOCs and the 
county-led OA EOC to monitor radio traffic and also communicate between the zone and 
with field units would enhance communications capabilities and situational awareness. 
Auxiliary Communications Service (ACS) or Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services 
(RACES) would also be an important resource to cultivate and utilize at the zone EOCs 
and the county-led OA EOC for further enhancing situational awareness.  
7. Joint Information Center/Joint Information System 
Zone EOCs will require standing up of JICs and use of a JIS as public information 
will need to be disseminated across multiple local governments and unincorporated 
communities within each zone. The public information officers (PIO) or designated staff 
from each local government would staff their respective zone EOC JICs. The county-led 
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OA EOC has a JIS that the zone EOCs could adapt and implement, which will 
additionally provide standardization across the OA. A zone-based JIC/JIS, coordinated 
with the county JIC/JIS, will provide a unified and standardized means to manage and 
effectively disseminate public information across the OA on a zone-by-zone basis, versus 
the existing disparate local government based approach. 
8. Situational Awareness Tools 
The zone EOCs should utilize technological tools that enhance situational 
awareness such as WebEOC, California Common Operating Picture (Cal COP), 
Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping, social media, and mass notification 
systems. Background information on these situational awareness tools is presented in 
Appendix A. These tools are used by the county-led OA EOC and if integrated with the 
zone EOCs, they will assist the county-led OA EOC and the zone EOCs to have a better 
common operating picture.  
WebEOC is currently used by the county-led OA EOC and the EOCs of the local 
governments primarily for resource requests, information sharing, and mission tasking. 
The WebEOC versions used in the zone EOCs can be configured to have boards that 
provide summary information for each zone, in addition to tracking data for individual 
local governments within each zone. Mission and resource requests from the zone EOCs 
to the county-led OA EOC will be zone based with the need to build in additional 
capability to track situation status details for each individual local government. The 
county-led OA EOC WebEOC version will require configuration to track and respond to 
zone based data, including mission and resource requests from zone EOCs and internal to 
zone EOCs. The zone based configurations of WebEOC will enable the zone EOCs and 
the county-led OA EOC to have situational awareness that promotes a common operating 
picture on a zone wide basis with the additional ability to track information by local 
governments. 
Currently, only county level first responder agencies are either providing or 
considering providing data feeds into Cal COP for improving situational awareness. 
Encouraging local governments within the OA to also provide data feeds from their 
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appropriate agencies to Cal COP will further enhance overall situational awareness across 
the OA. Cal COP can also be configured to display data for the county-led OA EOC and 
zone EOCs on a zone by zone basis, which will prove useful for zone level situational 
awareness.  
Local governments within the San Mateo County OA already use GIS-based 
mapping platforms for situational awareness. The creation and use of zone based map 
layers and features to overlay on existing mapping configurations will further enhance 
situational awareness for the zone EOCs and the county-led OA EOC at the zone levels 
across the OA. Social media sources can be tagged and profiled based on the local 
governments within each zone in the OA to provide a zone based social media profile, 
which will provide another source of situational awareness and valuable real-time 
information feeds at the zone based level.  
A single platform, mass notification system is currently used across the San 
Mateo County OA, with the local governments having control over their respective 
jurisdictions in the system. In coordination with the local governments, the county could 
configure the mass notification system to broadcast alerts and warnings simultaneously to 
residents within local governments and unincorporated communities within a zone. This 
will allow for unified public alert and warning messaging across zones in the OA. The 
zone based alerting configuration could also alert and notify personnel designated to staff 
the zone EOCs when needed. An alerting entity should be pre-designated for each zone to 
broadcast zone based alerts and notifications to designated personnel assigned to staff the 
zone EOCs. A county-led OA EOC would be an ideal back-up alerting entity to broadcast 
such zone based alerts and notifications on behalf of zone EOCs, and it could also be 
designated as a primary alerting entity for zone EOCs. Currently, the mass notification 
system used in the San Mateo County OA has the capability to allow for this zone based 
notification configuration and can be implemented accordingly.  
The technological tools that enhance situational awareness and promote a 
common operating picture further enable more effective and efficient multilateral 
coordination in the zone EOC concept. Common and interoperable technological tools 
implemented in a standardized way across jurisdictions can resolve duplicative efforts 
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and bring clarity to overall response management, promote quick and informed decision 
making, and improve effective and efficient coordinated response. Having common 
systems will enhance interagency communications, situational awareness, and common 
operating picture for all jurisdictions, not only within OAs but beyond.  
9. Deactivation 
While a standardized policy for deactivation of the zone EOCs across the OA 
zones is preferable, the zone EOC concept will be more resilient by allowing flexibility 
for local governments within each zone to collectively decide and formally agree upon 
their respective zone EOC deactivation triggers and thresholds. The deactivation triggers 
and thresholds that apply for independent jurisdictional EOCs would apply for the zone 
EOCs in the context of their respective zones and constituent local governments. The 
deactivation triggers and thresholds may also be dependent on the scale of the response 
needs. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The zone EOC concept will enable county-led OA EOCs to more effectively 
coordinate with and support their affected local governments, which will also have the 
ability to pool their resources to provide emergency response coordination and support 
services within their jurisdictions via consolidated zone EOCs. The zone EOC concept 
provides a solution that addresses the challenges of unmanageable span of control for 
intra-OA emergency response coordination during catastrophic disasters and the limited 
availability of trained personnel to staff fully activated EOCs for extended periods at 
local governments. Figure 4 provides an illustration of a more manageable span of 
control for the San Mateo County OA when supporting local governments within the OA. 
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Figure 4.  Suggested zone EOC model intended for better span of control 
designed for the San Mateo County OA 
The zone EOC concept also moderates the burden on counties to directly 
supplement and support severely affected local governments unable to provide 
emergency response services as those service functions could be continued through their 
respective zone EOCs. Jurisdictions within a zone will also be better able to coordinate 
sharing of resources and collectively prioritize community needs through their zone 
EOCs and zone based mutual aid agreements. Increased zone based mutual aid 
coordination and sharing will also reduce the amount of resource requests to county-led 
OA EOCs, thereby, reducing the emergency response coordination burden on OA EOCs. 
The zone EOC concept will additionally assist in facilitating more effective and efficient 
response coordination between counties and their constituent local governments when 
responding to catastrophic disasters. 
The zone EOC concept will provide other benefits, including efficiency gains via 
sharing of limited resources among local governments, in particular, sharing trained EOC 
personnel resources, who will assist in remediating existing personnel shortfalls to staff 
fully activated EOCs. Additional benefits include promotion and strengthening of 
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collaborative working relationships across local governments and leveraging cost savings 
via cost sharing and decrease in duplicative services and personnel labor costs.53 Also, 
community partners, such as private sector and non-profit entities, would benefit from 
consolidation and centralization via zone EOCs, which streamlines coordination with 
local governments within an OA.54 
The benefits of the zone EOC concept significantly outweigh known potential 
risks and disadvantages; however, they will still need to be fully determined and solutions 
effectively applied. One of the major risks of consolidating multiple local government 
EOC functions into zone EOCs is that it will magnify the consequences of failure to 
adequately perform, given that more entities will be reliant on services from the 
consolidated zone EOCs. 55  Robust staffing plans, appropriate facilities provisions, 
adequate and sustained training and exercise regimens, and allocation of necessary 
funding support will be critical to address potential risks and disadvantages.  
                                                                   
53 Steven J. Carman, Unifying Emergency Operation Centers (Richmond Heights, MO: Richmond 
Heights Fire Department, 2014), 29. 
54 Ibid., 30. 
55 Ibid., 29. 
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IV. THE ZONE EOC CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION AND 
PORTABILITY 
You’ve got to think about big things while you’re doing small things, so 
that all the small things go in the right direction. 
– Alvin Toffler 
 
This chapter identifies critical considerations for successful adoption and 
implementation of the zone EOC concept in the San Mateo County OA, and it also 
determines portability and applicability of the concept to other OAs in the San Francisco 
Bay Area and beyond. 
A. ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementing the zone EOC concept within the San Mateo County OA will 
require obtaining the buy-in of senior leadership at all local governments in the OA, 
signing of formal agreements, and official adoption. Ensuring and assuring all 
participating jurisdictions that their jurisdictional authority will be retained and respected 
within the framework of the zone EOC concept is critical; without which, it will be 
highly unlikely to get majority buy-in and agreement. Seeking legal counsel advice from 
local governments within the OA early on is vital to ensure consideration and inclusion of 
legal provisions within the concept framework and formal agreements. Additionally, it 
will reduce political resistance and further the chances for successful adoption and 
implementation of the concept. 
The development of a cost-sharing model to fund the zone EOCs will require 
formal agreements. The logical option would be to source equitably shared funding from 
each member local government for its respective zone EOC. The San Mateo County ESC 
JPA may provide an avenue through which consensus can be reached for equitable cost 
sharing. The county should consider proportionally contributing funding toward all zone 
EOCs in an equitable manner. Furthermore, it should consider funding the establishment 
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of the zone EOCs and providing personnel training and exercise through eligible grant 
funding sources.  
A phased approach will ease implementing the zone EOC concept in the San 
Mateo County OA, as this endeavor will require considerable collaborative effort and it is 
a long-term project. While initial outreach should be conducted to all local governments 
in all zones, higher priority for implementation could be given to zones with a higher 
concentration of local governments. Zones with higher population densities, threats, 
vulnerabilities, and more at-risk assets could also be prioritized higher for 
implementation of the zone EOC concept. However, it may be more productive to 
prioritize zones with local governments that are more receptive and keen on 
implementing the zone EOC concept.  
The ideal implementation of the zone EOC concept would include the agreement 
of all of the constituent local governments to participate as members within their 
respective existing zones. However, if some local governments do not initially agree to 
participate in the zone EOCs, they could opt-out and continue with the existing protocol 
to have their EOCs directly coordinate with the county-led OA EOC. With time and 
institutionalization of the zone EOC concept in the OA, continued engagement with the 
entities that initially opted out may lead them to reconsider and participate. The zone 
EOC concept has implementation flexibility and can still function in parallel with the 
county-led OA EOC directly coordinating with some local governments, regardless of 
their geographic locations in demarcated zones.  
Established intra-OA multilateral collaborative frameworks, such as the San 
Mateo County ESC JPA for joint partnership in emergency management and the San 
Mateo County EMA, which assists in facilitating the implementation of the JPA, provide 
strong foundations that will ease and support the adoption and implementation of the 
zone EOC concept in the San Mateo County OA. Existing senior leadership preference 
and political will to further multilateral partnerships across the San Mateo County OA 
will also play a key role in the potential for successful outcomes.  
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The San Mateo County EMA and a majority of local governments that 
participated in the 2014–2015 OCC Exercise were open to agreeing to work together, and 
have voiced their support to explore implementing the zone EOC concept in the San 
Mateo County OA. As a follow up to the OCC exercise, as requested, the author will be 
presenting findings and recommendations to the San Mateo County City Managers 
Association with regards to the zone EOC concept. The author will also be drafting an 
MOU or multiagency coordination agreement for local governments to review in support 
of implementing the zone EOC concept in the San Mateo County OA. Lessons learned 
from the OCC Exercise highlight the need to determine and fully develop the details of 
the zone EOC concept and other aspects necessary for successful adoption and 
implementation. The detailed conceptualization of the zone EOC concept and its various 
elements in this thesis should provide a solid foundation and sufficient groundwork to 
support efforts to implement the concept. Follow-up exercises to the OCC Exercise are 
planned for 2016–2017, which will provide a valuable platform to further develop, test, 
and refine the zone EOC concept and assist in its successful implementation.  
B. PORTABILITY AND APPLICABILITY 
The San Mateo County OA and other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area utilize 
the same one-to-one intra-OA emergency response coordination model that is 
consistently applied to all incidents, emergencies, and disasters, including catastrophic 
disasters. The limitations of the existing intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model during catastrophic disasters and shortages in trained EOC personnel to staff fully 
activated EOCs in local governments within OAs are common challenges faced by all 
OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
In addition, all OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area adhere to standardized NIMS 
and SEMS frameworks and requirements. As OAs is a SEMS organization level 
designation, the jurisdictional framework for all OAs and their constituent local 
governments for coordinating emergency activities in the San Francisco Bay Area and the 
state of California is the same. The San Francisco Bay Area OAs have developed closer 
standardization in emergency response coordination and planning over the past decade as 
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a result of collaboration as partners in a common region. Moreover, substantial federal 
grant funding over the last decade has played an important role in further aligning the 
OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area toward a common standard and culture that promote 
regionalized planning for preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery.  
The zone EOC concept works within the frameworks of NIMS and SEMS, and it 
also aligns with the SEMS organizational level hierarchy of coordination between local 
governments and their respective OAs, and the SEMS functions of local governments and 
OAs. The zone EOC concept is derived from the ICS and MACS concepts, which are 
already utilized by all OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond. The key aspect of 
the zone EOC concept is that it provides an effective multilateral collaborative 
coordination mechanism for local government level entities to coordinate emergency 
services within their jurisdictions.  
Based on the zone EOC concept’s alignment with NIMS and SEMS frameworks, 
derivation from standard practices, such as ICS and MACS concepts, and the common 
SEMS based jurisdictional framework for local governments and OAs to coordinate 
emergency activities, the concept should be portable and applicable to other OAs in the 
San Francisco Bay Area and likely beyond as well. The flexibility and scalability of the 
zone EOC concept should allow other OAs to adapt the concept as needed, which 





V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Coming together is a beginning, staying together is progress, and working 
together is success. 
– Henry Ford 
 
This chapter presents recommendations and conclusions that are informed by the 
thesis research and analysis on an alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model featuring zone-based consolidated local government EOCs that would be more 
effective during catastrophic disasters in the San Mateo County OA, and in other OAs in 
the San Francisco Bay Area and possibly beyond. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The implementation of the recommendations developed based on insights gained 
from this thesis research will provide real-world benefits to address the need for an 
alternative, intra-OA emergency response coordination system that would be more 
effective during catastrophic disasters in the San Mateo County OA and other OAs in the 
San Francisco Bay Area.  
1. Further Develop and Implement the Zone EOC Concept in the San 
Mateo County OA  
The San Mateo County OA should proceed in further developing and formally 
adopting, implementing, and institutionalizing the zone EOC concept. While the key 
elements of the zone EOC concept have been presented and addressed in this thesis, there 
may be certain aspects that may have been overlooked or need closer scrutiny to better 
define applicable requirements and measures for successful implementation. This can be 
addressed by subsequent efforts to apply the zone EOC concept in the San Mateo County 
OA.  
The San Mateo County EMA is an ideal starting point to further refine the 
concept, address any oversights and omissions, identify additional challenges, and 
propose solutions prior to outreaching other stakeholders in the OA. Engaging the San 
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Mateo County EMA will also help ensure countywide inclusiveness of a key decision-
influencing constituency in the initial planning efforts, which in turn will promote buy-in 
and support across the OA. A cross-spectrum working group comprising of appropriate 
representatives from the county and other local governments within the OA may provide 
a good forum and approach at a later stage to further advance the zone EOC concept 
planning for the OA. Importantly, the San Mateo County EMA would need to closely 
coordinate with this working group and inform the planning process.  
Senior leadership and key decision makers from local governments within the OA 
will need to be continually informed and engaged with the planning and decision making 
process. An outreach campaign to inform and solicit input from all relevant stakeholders 
in the OA should be a critical component of the planning and decision making process.  
Key areas of focus and prioritization for furthering the zone EOC concept include 
the following:  
• Legal framework  
• Cost-sharing and funding support 
• Staffing plans 
• Primary and alternate facilities 
• Concept implementation approach 
• Activation and deactivation thresholds 
• County-led OA EOC policy group expansion and representation 
composition 
• Intra-zone mutual aid agreements between local governments 
• Expanded zone EOC policy group decision making criteria and priorities 
• OA wide adoption, implementation and institutionalization 
• Training and exercise 
2. Socialize the Zone EOC Concept and Promote Portability in the San 
Francisco Bay Area 
The zone EOC concept aligns and works within the NIMS and SEMS 
frameworks, providing a multilateral collaborative intra-OA emergency response 
coordination model that could be ported and applied to other OAs in the San Francisco 
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Bay Area and beyond. Additionally, the flexibility and scalability of the zone EOC 
concept would allow other OAs to adapt the concept as needed.  
Socialization of the zone EOC concept and promoting its portability and 
applicability to other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area would benefit the interests of 
all OAs in the region and the region as a whole. All OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area 
have a common need for a more effective intra-OA emergency response coordination 
model that also addresses shortages of trained EOC personnel resources to staff fully 
activated EOCs in all local governments within OAs—a mutually shared challenge. OAs 
elsewhere likely have a similar need.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The risks of catastrophic disasters from earthquakes are extremely high for the 
San Mateo County OA and the San Francisco Bay Area. Effective intra-OA emergency 
response coordination between local governments will be critical during the aftermath of 
a catastrophic earthquake that impacts a wide geographic area.  
This thesis defines the problem space and identifies the limitations of the existing 
intra-OA emergency response coordination model during catastrophic disasters. This 
thesis also recognizes the need for a more effective alternative model for the San Mateo 
County OA and other OAs in the Bay Area and beyond, and analyzes an alternative 
multilateral collaborative model solution, the zone EOC concept. The detailed outline and 
analysis of the zone EOC concept and its various elements in the context of the San 
Mateo County OA provide a clear understanding of what the concept entails and 
highlights key aspects required for successful adoption and implementation. In addition, 
it considers the potential for portability and applicability in other OAs in the San 
Francisco Bay Area and beyond.  
The zone EOC concept provides an alternate multilateral collaborative intra-OA 
emergency response coordination model that would work more effectively in the San 
Mateo County OA and possibly other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond, 
during catastrophic disasters. Some of the key aspects for successful adoption and 
implementation of the zone EOC concept include: senior leadership and stakeholder buy-
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in and support; addressing concerns for legal liabilities and potential loss of jurisdictional 
control and authority; cost-sharing and allocation of sustainable funding support; long-
term staffing and training and exercise plans; and provision of appropriate facilities for 
the zone EOCs. The significance of this research is that it provides the San Mateo County 
OA and possibly other OAs in the San Francisco Bay Area and beyond a well-defined, 
more effective alternate intra-OA emergency response coordination model as a viable 





APPENDIX A. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS, 
POLICIES, GUIDELINES, AND USE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
TOOLS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix presents emergency management frameworks, policies, and 
guidelines for response to complex events, including catastrophic disasters. 
Technological tools that assist with situational awareness and promote a common 
operating picture are also discussed in the context of their usefulness for emergency 
response coordination. 
B. THE STAFFORD ACT 
As best described by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):  
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was 
signed into law on November 23, 1988; amended the Disaster Relief Act 
of 1974. The Stafford Act constitutes the statutory authority for most 
Federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency and FEMA programs.56  
In other words, the Stafford Act is a federal law designed to “provide an orderly and 
continuing means of assistance by the federal government to state and local governments 
in carrying out their responsibilities.”57 
Title six of the Stafford Act explains the measures to organize agencies for 
expected threats to include assigning trained staff, preparing operational plans and 
creating appropriate early warning systems. According to the Stafford Act’s Emergency 
Preparedness Doctrine, 
Title six also sets out the authority and responsibilities of the director of 
FEMA. The director may prepare and direct federal plans and programs                                                                    
56 Federal Emergency Management Agency, The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act as Amended (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), accessed 
July 26, 2015 http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1383153669955-
21f970b19e8eaa67087b7da9f4af706e/stafford_act_booklet_042213_508e.pdf, 1.  
57 Ibid.  
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for U.S. emergency preparedness. The director should also delegate 
emergency responsibilities to federal agencies and state and local 
governments. 58  Additionally, executives and agencies that have 
emergency preparedness roles should be provided adequate training.59  
Title six directs the FEMA director to oversee development of emergency 
preparedness compacts, known as emergency management assistance compacts 
(EMACs)60 In addition, the Stafford Act states, “the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact (EMAC) is an interstate mutual aid agreement that was developed out of the 
need to assist and coordinate resources across states in the event of a disaster situation.”61 
C. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
The terror attacks on September 11, 2001 resulted in government reorganization 
and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the resulting homeland 
security enterprise, consisting of 22 consolidated agencies. According to the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, “The National Response Plan (NRP) was created to align 
federal resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic 
incident management.”62 In her thesis, Frazzano explains, “National Response Plan was 
developed from Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) and suggested the 
development of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).”63 NIMS was a 
guide for response to “domestic” incidents regardless of complexity or size. In 2008, the 
NRP was replaced by the National Response Framework (NRF), which continues to use 
the concepts established in NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS).  
                                                                   
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid., 62–65.   
60 Ibid., 1.  
61 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 
Overview for National Response Framework (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACoverviewForNRF.pdf.  
62 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Authority. An Introduction to All-Hazards 
Preparedness for Transit Agencies, 2010, http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/All_hazards.pdf, 2.   
63 Tracey L. Frazzano, “Local Jurisdictions and Active Shooters: Building Networks, Building 
Capacities” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School., 2010), 10.  
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As a result of the creation of DHS, a large body of doctrine, policies, and grant 
guideline were established at the federal level as well as for state and local governments. 
The policies were designed around the cabinet level Homeland Security Department. 
There are no doctrines or policies that address multi-attack scenarios or multilateralism 
for local government jurisdictions. “The National Response Framework (NRF) focuses 
on several areas including terror attacks associated with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).” 64  However, the framework does not address incidents outside of WMD 
scenarios, leaving a gap for ongoing and continuous threats of conventional attacks in the 
United States by lone wolf violent extremists or radicalized groups.  
D. NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 notes, “Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 called for the creation of a National Response Plan (NRP).”65 
HSPD-5 later changed the NRP to the National Response Framework stating, 
National Response Framework (NRF) and a National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) was created. The system ensures a 
consistent nationwide framework for local, state, and federal agencies to 
work effectively; an integral part of the framework is the use of the 
Incident Command System (ICS).66  
Faggiano, McNall, Gillespie note, “The National Incident Management System is a 
comprehensive, national approach to incident management that is applicable at all 
jurisdictional levels across functional disciplines.” 67  NIMS requires “a common 
operating picture for information management and information sharing support at all 
levels.”68                                                                    
64 Ibid.  
65 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003), accessed July 10, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf, 1.  
66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-
25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf, 3.  
67 Vincent Faggiano, John McNall, Tom Gillespie, Critical Incident Management, 2nd ed. ((Boca 
Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, 2012), 79.  
68 Frazzano, “Local Jurisdictions and Active Shooters,” 12. 
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1. Incident Command System 
A FEMA document explains, “The Incident Command System (ICS) defines 
operating characteristics, management components, and the structure of incident 
management organizations throughout the incident.”69 Erickson remarks, “The Incident 
Commander (IC) is located at the Incident Command Post (ICP) at the incident scene.”70 
There is no legal mandate to use ICS; however, any agency that does not use the 
framework provided during an incident may not be eligible for federal reimbursement. A 
unified command (UC) is when two or more disciplines (e.g., fire, law, health, public 
works) come together under the Incident Command model and work together as one 
“unified” command.  
The ICS relies heavily on the sharing of information from the field level 
command posts to emergency operations centers. Information is crucial for decision 
makers to best understand the situation and its level of complexity. When information is 
fragmented and personnel reach overload, decisions often become reactive, based on 
stimulus response. Practitioners have learned that too much information can also become 
a distraction to the overall decision-making process and can, at times, hinder quick 
decisions during a complex or chaotic event where timing is essential. Having a holism 
mindset can help policy makers see through the congestion of noise during an incident 
rather than fall victim to a reductionist’s position of inability to act.  
2. Area Commands 
Area command is used for multi-scene incidents or emergencies. An area 
command is defined by Paul Erickson in his book Emergency Response Planning for 
Corporate and Municipal Managers: 
An Area Command is established as necessary to provide command 
authority and coordination for two or more incidents in close proximity.                                                                    
69 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System (NIMS): an 
Introduction, IS-700, Facilitator Guide, 2004, http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/nims-
facilitatorsguide.pdf?&session-id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de, 7.  
70 Paul Erickson, Emergency Response Planning for Corporate and Municipal Managers (Oxford, 
UK: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006), 49.  
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Area Command works directly with incident commanders. Area 
Command becomes Unified Area Command when incidents or 
emergencies are multi-jurisdictional. Area Command may be established 
as an EOC facility or at some location other than the Incident Command 
Post.71  
The University of South Florida, Tampa, Emergency Operations Plan explains 
that an “Area Command is an expansion of the incident command function primarily 
designed to manage a very large incident or emergency that has multiple incident 
management teams or an event,” 72  which can affect more than one jurisdiction. 
Additionally, under the ICS model area commands are flexible enough to integrate into a 
multi-discipline field command center. As noted in the Tampa Emergency Operations 
Plan, “Area Command may also be conducted as a Unified Area Command.”73 
3. Emergency Operations Center 
According to FEMA, “An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is a physical 
location where the coordination of information and resources to support response 
management takes place.” 74  EOCs integrate information from multiple sources or 
incidents to establish a common operating picture (COP) and provide situational 
awareness for coordination efforts. When the scope of an event is beyond the capability 
to be resolved at the field command post level, an “Emergency Operations Center may be 
activated to support the Incident Commander”75  and resource requests. The EOC is 
comprised of a separate group of higher level administrators, or a policy group, that will 
respond when called. The EOC has the important role of coordination and support during 
an event.  
                                                                   
71 Ibid., 49. 
72 University of South Florida, Tampa, Emergency Operations Plan (Tampa, FL: University of South 
Florida, 2014), http://www.usf.edu/pdfs/USF-Emergency-Operations-Plan.pdf?&session-
id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de.pdf, 30.  
73 Cal OES, SEMS Guidelines, 21.  
74 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Incident Command System (ICS) Resource Center,” 
accessed July 10, 2015, https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/glossary.htm, 4.  
75 Ibid. 
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4. Policy Group 
The policy group is comprised of elected officials like the mayor or Board of 
Supervisors, the chief of police, fire chief, elected sheriff and city/county counsel; 
however, the policy group may also include the district attorney, public health director, 
coroner, public works director, etc., depending on the type and size of the event. The 
policy group has the responsibility to ensure appropriate direction and decisions are being 
conveyed throughout the response management period. A policy group’s authority 
extends to other levels of the response organizational structure, from the EOC, MAC 
group to the incident commander. The policy group will manage continuity or implement 
the organizational continuity of operations plan (COOP) to keep operations running 
during the event.  
5. Department Operations Center 
A “Department Operations Center (DOC) is a location or facility”76 used by an 
agency as a department level operations center. Examples include fire departments or 
special districts, police/sheriff, public works, public health or districts. With a multi-
discipline team approach, “DOCs can be used at all SEMS levels above the field response 
level, depending on the impacts of the emergency, demographic nature of the agency or 
organization, local policy and procedures, and configuration of communications 
systems.”77 DOCs coordinate with field level command posts or EOCs, depending on the 
scale of the event.  
6. Multiagency Coordination System 
In the Critical Incident Management, the authors declare, “Multi-Agency 
Coordination System defines the operating characteristics, management components, and 
organizational structure of supporting entities.”78 Agencies may develop a multiagency                                                                    
76 Cupertino ARES/RACES, “Citizen Corps Department Operations Center (DOC),” September 6, 
2012, accessed August 24, 2015, http://www.cupertinoares.org/arc/training/120906-DOC-Concept-
Overview.pdf, 4.  
77 Ibid.   
78 Faggiano, McNall, and Gillespie, Critical Incident Management, 81.  
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coordination system (MACS) to develop formal partnerships and working relationships to 
support each other during prolonged or significant events. A MACS is generally used to 
“coordinate resources between participating agencies or jurisdictions.”79 In addition, a 
MACS “coordinates activities above the field level and prioritizes response needs for 
critical or competing resources.” 80  Furthermore, a MACS assists in establishing 
personnel, procedures, protocols, business practices, and communications to support 
responses to event(s).  
The use of the MACS is to increase the OA’s ability to assist individual or 
multiple incidents, emergencies or disasters under the SEMS and OA concept. FEMA 
notes, “MACS do not eliminate command authority from a jurisdiction or an agency, but 
assists them through information management and logistical support.”81  Multiagency 
coordination in the form of MACS offers more effective ways for jurisdictions and 
agencies to collaborate. Like in a unified or area command, a MACS can also be applied 
across different disciplines. Additionally, a MACS can be established whenever 
personnel from different organizations interact. Unlike field command posts or EOCs, a 
MACS group will help establish “a common operating picture, set priorities among 
incidents and resolve critical resource issues by facilitating logistics support and resource 
tracking, and synchronizing messaging”82 to ensure that agencies and jurisdictions are 
speaking with one voice. According to FEMA, “The success of the MAC Group depends 
on membership and should be staffed by personnel representing multiple jurisdictions 
and functional disciplines.”83 Another benefit of establishing a MAC group is that it 
promotes public confidence by showing that leaders are willing to come together and 
solve a problem in a “team of teams” concept. As the Critical Incident Management 
authors advocate, “Organizations that have not traditionally interacted well are now                                                                    
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.   
81 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Incident Command System (ICS) Resource Center,” 7.   
82 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Understanding Multiagency Coordination, IS-701.A,” 
February 2010, https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is701a/visuals/
02_is701a_macs_16feb2010.ppt+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.  
83 Ibid., 11.  
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training together and will therefore be better prepared to respond together. We can no 
longer allow petty difference to compromise the protection of our communities.”84  
Figure 5 depicts examples of how a MACS can be formed or used to better 
support multiple incidents, multiple jurisdictions, or zone EOCs during an ongoing 
critical or complex situation. On the left of Figure 5 is an example of multiple small 
jurisdictions combining resources into geographic based regional zone EOC or MACS to 
better coordinate with an OA EOC.  
 
Figure 5.  Illustration of zone EOC coordination within an operational area 
7. Joint Information System and Joint Information Center 
A joint information system (JIS) is commonly known as a group of public 
information officers (PIOs) working together as a team, having specific objectives of 
information gathering, sharing and dissemination, primarily to the public via several 
commonly used media platforms. A JIS “provides the mechanism to organize, integrate 
and coordinate information to ensure timely, accurate, accessible and consistent                                                                    
84 Faggiano, McNall, Gillespie, Critical Incident Management, 11.  
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messaging across multiple jurisdictions and/or disciplines.”85 The need for a functional, 
information sharing nucleus is ever-present, which is why a joint information center (JIC) 
is created. This is explained San Mateo County OES JIS plan draft:  
The Joint Information Center is the central location that facilitates the 
operation of the JIS. It is a physical or an Internet-based virtual location 
where personnel with public information responsibilities perform media 
and community relation duties during an incident, emergency or disaster. 
The JIC structure is designed to work equally well for incidents, 
emergencies, and disasters, and can expand or contract to meet response 
needs.86  
The JIC creates information maneuverability, opening channels of communication 
when emergencies occur. The San Mateo County OES JIS plan draft states:  
Efficient information flow is critical to effectively meet public information 
needs and carry out PIO responsibilities when multiple organizations 
come together to respond to an emergency or manage an event. By 
maintaining a centralized communication facility, resources can be better 
managed and duplication of effort is minimized. The use of a JIC 
additionally allows for tracking and maintaining records and 
information.87 
E. STANDARDIZED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
The following information was taken from the July 2008 Marin County Emergency Operations Plan 
(EOP), which was later adopted in 2015 by San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services for its EOP. 
The information below is paraphrased. 
SEMS was introduced in 1994 to the state of California to help coordinate 
emergency response when there are multiple jurisdictions involved. Some jurisdictions 
may choose to contract fire and police services with other agency jurisdictions to handle 
emergency response responsibilities. The preceding Table 3 in Chapter II, for example, 
                                                                   
85 B. Wayne Blanchard, Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, 
Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders and Legislation (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008), accessed July 10, 2015, http://training.fema.gov/hiedu/
docs/terms%20and%20definitions/terms%20and%20definitions.pdf?&session-
id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de, 671.   
86 Information taken from page 3 the San Mateo County OES JIS plan draft, not yet adopted. July 25, 
2015. 
87 Ibid.  
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illustrates the existing service contract status of jurisdictions within the San Mateo 
County OA. 
Local governments within an OA are equally liable for emergency service 
coordination with other jurisdictions with the OA. As such, when requested for mutual 
aid support, in most cases for law, fire, EMS or public works, an agency or jurisdiction is 
expected to assist in fulfilling requests within their capacity. The SEMS framework 
provides a guideline for such circumstances:  
the Standardized Emergency Management System is the system required 
by Government Code Section 8607(a) for managing emergencies 
involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies. SEMS consists of five 
organizational levels, which are activated as necessary: Field response, 
Local Government, Operational Area, Regional and State.88 
There are two basic requirements for SEMS and NIMS: “the Field Response and 
the Local Government levels. At the field response level, all agencies will use the 
Incident Command System (ICS) to standardize the emergency response.”89 At the San 
Mateo County OA level, the designated county-led OA EOC is used as “the central 
location for gathering and disseminating information, coordinating all jurisdictional 
emergency operations, and coordinating with the Cal OES Coastal Region and the Cal 
OES.”90 
F. MUTUAL AID  
Two types of mutual aid are discussed in this chapter: interstate or mutual aid 
shared between states, more common with east coast states due to their size and close 
proximity to each other, and a review of the California mutual aid systems practiced 
today. 
                                                                   
88 Cal OES, SEMS Guidelines, 21.  
89 Marin County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services, Marin Operational Area Emergency 
Operations Plan. (Marin, CA: Marin County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services, 2008), accessed July 
10, 2015, http://marinsheriff.org/uploads/documents/Marin_EOP.pdf?&session-
id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de, 10–11.  
90 Ibid. 
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1. Interstate: Emergency Management Assistance Compact  
Although common is most states, the notion of a national association specific to 
emergency management is just four decades old: “the National Emergency Management 
Association (NEMA) was established in 1974 when state directors of emergency 
management first united in order to exchange information on common emergency 
management issues that threatened their constituencies.”91 EMAC is a:  
national interstate mutual aid agreement that enables states to share 
resources during times of disaster. Since the 104th Congress ratified the 
compact, EMAC has grown to become the nation’s system for providing 
Mutual Aid through operational procedures and protocols that have been 
validated through experience.92  
Another platform for aid in resource management is the sharing and inventorying 
of resources with other member states.93  According to the EMAC website, “EMAC 
offers assistance during governor-declared states of emergency through a responsive, 
straightforward system that allows states to send personnel, equipment and commodities 
to help disaster relief efforts in other states.”94 The national model may inform local 
governments on how to apply the same concept to their jurisdictions by partnering with 
neighboring jurisdictions for sharing resources and mutual aid.  
2. California State Mutual Aid Systems 
In 2012, the city of Palmdale, California adopted an emergency operations plan 
(EOP) that thoroughly described the state’s Mutual Aid System. Because the history and 
definitions remains unchanged, San Mateo County later adopted the same language for its 
                                                                   
91 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Assistance Compact.  
92 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Operational Templates and Guidance for EMS Mass 
Incident Deployment, (Washington, DC; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012), accessed July 
13, 2015, http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/
templates_guidance_ems_mass_incident_deployment.pdf?&session-
id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de, 135.  
93 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).  
94 Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), “What is EMAC?” accessed July 26, 2015, 
http://www.emacweb.org/index.php/learnaboutemac/what-is-emac.  
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OA EOP. The following information was taken from the originating city of Palmdale’s 
EOP as it relates to the thesis topic: 
The foundation of California’s emergency planning and response is a 
statewide Mutual Aid System that is designed to ensure adequate 
resources, facilities and other support is provided to jurisdictions 
whenever their own resources prove to be inadequate to cope with given 
situation(s). The basis for the system is the California Disaster and Civil 
Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement, as provided in the California 
Emergency Services Act. This Agreement was developed in 1950 and has 
been adopted by the state, all 58 counties and most incorporated cities in 
the State of California. The Master Mutual Aid Agreement creates a 
formal structure wherein each jurisdiction retains control of its own 
facilities, personnel and resources, but may also receive or render 
assistance to other jurisdictions within the state. State government is 
obligated to provide available resources to assist local jurisdictions 
[governments] in emergencies. It is the responsibility of the local 
jurisdiction to negotiate, coordinate and prepare Mutual Aid agreements.95 
3. Mutual Aid System  
The Mutual Aid System, discussed as it applies to the state of California under the 
SEMS framework is “a statewide Mutual Aid System, operating within the framework of 
the Master Mutual Aid Agreement, allows for the progressive mobilization of resources 
to and from emergency response agencies, local governments, Operational Areas, regions 
and state with the intent to provide requesting agencies with adequate resources.”96 The 
state Mutual Aid System includes: fire and rescue, law enforcement, medical, coroner, 
building and safety, and public works. The described “systems work through local 
government, Operational Area, regional and state levels consistent with SEMS/NIMS. 
Mutual Aid may also be obtained from other states.”97  
The San Mateo County OA: 
is part of the Mutual Aid Region II and the Coastal Administrative 
Region. The primary mission of Coastal Region’s emergency management                                                                    
95 City of Palmdale, City of Palmdale Emergency Operations Plan (Palmdale, CA: City of Palmdale, 
2012), accessed July 13, 2015, http://www.cityofpalmdale.org/Portals/0/Documents/Residents/
COP%20EOP%20Executive%20Summary.pdf?&session-id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de, 15.  
96 Ibid., 54. 
97 Ibid. 
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organization is to support Operational Area response and recovery 
operations and to coordinate non-law and non-fire and non-EMS Mutual 
Aid Regional response and recovery operations through the California 
State Regional EOC (REOC).98 
4. Mutual Aid Regions
According to the Contra Costa County Office of Emergency Services: 
Mutual aid regions are established under the Emergency Services Act. Six 
Mutual Aid regions numbered I-VI have been established within 
California. The San Mateo OA is within Region II. Each Mutual Aid 
region consists of designated counties. Region II is in the Coastal 
Administrative Region.99  
Figure 6 provides a color-coded illustration of mutual aid regions within the state 
of California. 
98 Marin County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services (OES), Marin Operational Area Emergency 
Operations Plan (Marin, CA: Marin County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services, 2008), accessed July 
10, 2015, http://marinsheriff.org/uploads/documents/Marin_EOP.pdf?&session-
id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de, 10–11.  
99 Contra Costa County Office of Emergency Services, Contra Costa Operational Area Emergency 
Operations Plan (Contra Costa, CA: Contra Costa County Office of Emergency Services, 2009), accessed 
July 14, 2015, http://www.contracosta.ca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/7352?&session-
id=2bfb5076d8728bf8925012353f68c6de, 16.  
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Figure 6.  California state mutual aid regions100 
5. Mutual Aid Coordinators  
The Region II mutual aid coordinator for the San Mateo County OA is the 
Alameda County Sheriff’s Office. The California Office of Emergency Services states:  
To facilitate Mutual Aid, discipline-specific Mutual Aid Systems work 
through designated Mutual Aid Coordinators at the Operational Area, 
regional and state levels. The basic role of a Mutual Aid Coordinator is to 
receive Mutual Aid requests, coordinate the provision of resources from 
within the coordinator’s geographic area of responsibility and pass on 
unfilled requests to the next level.101  
G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS 
Technology enables an improved ability to collect, analyze, communicate, and 
consume information. Technology offers a visual picture for public safety personnel to 
                                                                   
100 California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), “Mutual Aid Regions Map,” 2007, 
http://www.vfpd.net/operations/Expanded_Mut-Aid.jpg.  
101 Cal OES, SEMS Guidelines, 9.  
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better understand an event and can guide managers in response efforts by producing 
knowledge that can help develop a course of action.  
The National Response Framework (NRF) defines Situational Awareness 
as the ability to identify, process, and comprehend the critical information 
about an incident—knowing what is going on around you—which requires 
continuous monitoring of relevant sources of information regarding actual 
incident and developing hazards.102  
The FEMA National Incident Support Manual defines situational awareness as a result of 
comprehensive information collection, analysis, and dissemination in a context relevant 
to the authorities and responsibilities of a particular organization level.103 The FEMA 
National Incident Support Manual defines common operating picture (COP) as a shared 
situational awareness that:  
offers a standard overview of an incident and provides information in a 
manner that enables incident leadership and any supporting agencies to 
make effective, consistent, coordinated, and timely decisions. The NRF 
defines COP as a continuously updated overview of an incident compiled 
throughout an incident’s life cycle from data shared between integrated 
systems for communication, information, management, intelligence and 
information sharing.104  
Technology has provided EOC personnel a more cognizant level of situational awareness. 
An improved level of situational awareness will provide EOC personnel the information 
needed to better comprehend the breadth and depth of the response required. In contrast, 
a lack of collaboration can limit situational awareness and therefore, EOCs will not have 
information to share with each other or more importantly, with Incident Commanders in 
the field. “A collaborative environment requires the sharing of authority and a command 
                                                                   
102 Developing and Maintaining Effective Situational Awareness (presented 28th Governor’s Hurricane 
Conference, Orlando, FL, May 2013), http://flghc.org/ppt/2014/Training%20Sessions/
TS37%20Developing%20&%20Maintaining/TS-37%20GHC2014%20-
%20Developing%20and%20Maintaining%20Effective%20SA.pdf, 11.  
103 Ibid., 12.  
104 Ibid., 19.  
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and control structure that is more open and democratic.” 105  Situational awareness 
technology fulfills the goal of collaboration amongst jurisdictions and other DOCs/EOCs.  
1. Mass Notification Systems 
Mass notification systems (MNS) capability can benefit a jurisdiction or multiple 
affected jurisdictions by notifying emergency responders in a designated geographic area. 
Emergency managers can quickly provide communities with life safety information and/ 
or warning of a pending danger. MNS outreach capabilities use multiple sources of 
communications, such as: sirens, landline telephones, wireless mobile devices, text 
messages, email, and social media. MNS can reach visitors and transient populations in 
an affected community or geographic area by designating areas of interest within the 
MNS program platforms. 
The National Preparedness Goal identified “Operational Communications” as 
one of its 31 core capabilities. The mission statement for operational communications 
states: “ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational 
awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected 
communities in the impact area and all response forces;”106 technology allows local 
governments to meet this goal.  
Interoperable MNS software platforms are presently used in several jurisdictions 
in the San Francisco Bay Area; however, individual local governments continue to invest 
in independent systems and have yet to fully combine resources to invest in shared 
regional systems. Typically, MNS in use in the San Francisco Bay Area are not shared 
outside of existing local government jurisdictions or OAs. Although there is technology 
available to provide a robust Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) for 
both government and public notifications for events requiring maximum and 
indiscriminate outreach, most jurisdictions continue to lack the ability to selectively                                                                    
105 Duane Smith, A Study of Command and Control of Multi-Agency Disaster Response Plans. 
(Phoenix, AZ: University of Phoenix, 2010), 36. 
106 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011), accessed July 9, 2015, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/
npg.pdf, 10.  
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communicate with each other or the public in selective geographic areas of interest 
through non-IPAWS means on standard MNS platforms. In a 2012 case study conducted 
by Filler and Associates for the 12 San Francisco Bay Area OAs that use MNS, the report 
concluded that there appears to be: 
…little formal or consistent regional coordination of alerting policy 
development and planning activities. The current patchwork of public 
warning systems among the OAs and other regional stakeholders causes 
great inconsistency in the type, content, and format of warnings received 
by the public. Almost all of the OAs’ warning tools must be activated one-
by-one and do not support simultaneous activation using the OASIS 
Common Alerting Protocol (CAP). This inhibits integration of OA 
technology systems and creates otherwise avoidable delay, additional 
workload, and opportunities for error for warning originators.107 
Collaborative MNS that are standardized and interoperable across multiple 
jurisdictions would be helpful to promote situational awareness and COP across 
numerous jurisdictions and even a region. Existing technology would allow each 
jurisdiction to maintain control over its own MNS while integrating that system into a 
larger regional “system of systems” to better manage multi-jurisdictional threats and 
hazards.108  
Federal efforts through IPAWS to modernize and integrate disparate MNS has 
also significantly enhanced capabilities for standardized and geographically wide-
reaching mass notifications via input in one platform and broadcast through multiple 
platforms. Under IPAWS, Alerting authorities at the Federal, State, and Local level 
can use IPAWS and integrate local systems that use Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) 
standards with the IPAWS infrastructure. IPAWS provides public safety officials with an 
effective way to alert and warn the public about serious emergencies using the 
Emergency Alert System (EAS), Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA), the National 
                                                                   
107 Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative, Bay Area Emergency Public Information and Warning 
Strategic Plan, 2012–2017 (San Francisco, CA: Filler & Associates, 2012), http://www.bayareauasi.org/
sites/default/files/resources/Bay%20Area%20UASI%20EPIW%20Strategic%20Plan_0.pdf, 44–46.   
108 Ibid. 
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Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio, and other public 
alerting systems from a single interface.109  
2. Geographic Information Systems 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) “software is designed to capture, manage, 
analyze, and display all forms of geographically referenced information.”110 GIS will 
allow EOC personnel to visualize events and the surrounding geographical areas in “ways 
that reveal relationships, patterns, and trends in the form of maps, globes, reports, and 
charts.”111 The company and popular vendor Environmental Systems Research Institute 
(ESRI) is known for its GIS products that are used in both the public and private sectors. 
Its website states: “GIS software helps you answer questions and solve problems by 
examining data in a way that is quickly understood and easily shared on a map.”112 The 
State of California recently contracted with a vendor to integrate GIS into its California 
Common Operating Picture (CAL COP) project that will enhance EOC operations and 
improve situational awareness among the OAs in the state. 
3. Web EOC / CAL EOC 
WebEOC is a software program developed by Intermedix, Inc. that many county 
and city EOCs in California are now using to communicate within their OAs and to 
collaborate within their respective regions. WebEOC can be fused into the state-wide 
system, Cal EOC for communication and resource requests to the state. WebEOC 
“provides position-specific activity logging and significant events tracking for a real-time 
common operating picture”113  of the life cycle of an event. Furthermore, WebEOC 
assists in providing situational awareness at the city and OA levels and Cal EOC assists                                                                    
109 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 
(IPAWS),” June 30, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/integrated-public-alert-warning-system. 




113 Intermedix Corporation, “WebEOC,” accessed September 12, 2015, https://www.intermedix.com/
product/product-webeoc/index.php.  
 71 
in providing situational awareness at the regional and state levels. Additionally, ICS 
forms used as part of EOC operations can be uploaded into WebEOC for sharing, 
documentation, and tracking. 
4. CAL COP 
The California Coalition of Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI), comprising 
of all UASIs in the state, recently funded a web-based situational awareness mapping 
software called the California Common Operating Picture (Cal COP). The CAL COP “is 
a cloud-based software that provides data to EOCs, dispatch centers and public safety 
agencies”114 on threat awareness by sharing data on critical infrastructures, using lists, 
geographic map imagery, and data analysis.  
Cal COP leverages local and regional risk management and critical 
infrastructure assessments layered with real-time, man-made, 
technological, and natural hazard threat information—to create a statewide 
threat situational awareness picture to more effectively and efficiently 
understand California’s threat landscape as it emerges across public safety 
disciplines, agencies, and jurisdictional boundaries. Access to information 
is managed securely through user-based privileges and data sharing 
agreements with participating agencies.115 
H. SUMMARY  
Technology as described above can assist in providing situational awareness and a 
common operating picture116 to an EOC and to those who are in positions to make 
critical decisions. Technology, when understood how and when to properly use, will 
bridge the gap on layered communications, enhance knowledge management, and 
expedite response, mitigation, and recovery operations during EOC operations.  
 
                                                                    
114 California Urban Areas Security Initiatives, “California Common Operating Picture (Cal COP),” 
January 5, 2015, accessed July 25, 2015, http://calcop.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Cal-COP-Program-
Overview_2015.pdf, 1. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Common terminology in law enforcement software based technologies used in the intelligence 
community and fusion centers.  
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APPENDIX B. CHALLENGES IN THE EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix provides further insights to additional challenges in emergency 
management and capability gaps, highlighting the politics of crisis management that 
contribute to decision making, the importance in unity of effort between and among 
agencies and local governments, the overall role of emergency management, and the 
status of organization and structure of emergency management in counties.  
B. THE POLITICS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
In the book, The Politics of Crisis Management, the authors discussed the subject 
of public leadership under pressure. Their initial message is that citizens who are affected 
by critical incidents “expect governments and public agencies to do their utmost to keep 
them out of harm’s way.”117 In other words, the public expects people in charge (i.e., 
elected officials, city managers and directors of emergency management) to swiftly make 
difficult decisions and implement courses of action. Public policy makers in key 
organizational and government positions do not have the luxury of criticizing a crisis 
response after the fact, as news commentators and academics often do. Public officials 
live in an arena of uncertainty where at any time scenarios can materialize and have a 
lasting effect on their sphere of influence or area of responsibility.  
Unlike days of past where most crisis were resolved by decisions made at the top 
levels of government, many crisis today are managed by an upward shift through 
reporting hierarchies in decision making. The measure of response is adjusted to the 
measure of the threat. When a crisis affects areas of other jurisdictions, responsibility for 
coordinating government responses will often shift to local or regional levels of authority. 
The authors of The Politics of Crisis Management remark, “The same goes for crises that 
are local in geographical terms but those whose depth and complexity exceed the coping                                                                    
117 Arjem Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 9.  
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capacity of local authorities.”118 Crisis response is not only shaped by decision makers, 
but also from implementation of those decisions. In most cities, the key success to crisis 
response is shaped by well trained and assigned personnel within the organization, rather 
than just its top policy makers. In The Politics of Crisis Management, the authors state, “a 
successful crisis management depends not so much on who is making the decisions but 
on the facilitation of crisis response implementation and coordination throughout the 
response network.”119 
In government, personnel transfers, promotions, and turnover is constant, 
potentially causing vacancies in key strategic positions within a given organization or 
department. In many cases, top level executives, new city managers, recently elected city 
council or mayors, etc., are relatively unfamiliar with what is expected of them and any 
previously adopted protocols or policies that apply toward emergency management. In 
areas like San Mateo County, California, where serious crisis are rare occurrences but 
highly likely, chances are high that many top executives have little or no experience with 
disaster response. Moreover, as the authors of The Politics of Crisis Management explain:  
since a crisis never conforms fully to the ones foreseen in the manuals, 
there is a high likelihood that the people gathering around the table will 
not always be familiar with one another, let alone have experience in 
working together as a group.120  
The need and abilities to coordinate and collaborate with partners from other jurisdictions 
and agencies creates its own challenges. 
For politicians,  
being an effective crisis manager may seem like a priority when voters 
evaluate candidates for high office, though many political executives will 
learn during the course of their tenure that it is a crucial quality they 
should possess if they want to stay in office and remain effective.121  
                                                                   
118 Ibid., 42.  
119 Ibid., 43.  
120 Ibid., 46.  
121 Ibid., 156.  
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Therefore, public officials rely on their police and fire chiefs to make the critical 
decisions and are often absent due to expectations of delegated duties. In a real world 
crisis, “the leadership potential that public office-holders claim to have is put to the test, 
and the testing is done in full public view thanks to the relentless media scrutiny that 
crisis generate.”122 Given all that is at stake, public expectations of local elected officials 
and government leaders is that they will be ready and prepared to answer the call when 
crisis arises.  
C. UNITY OF EFFORT 
In The Politics of Crisis Management, the authors’ state:  
Achieving unity of effort is the central challenge to effective homeland 
security response. No single organization, function, or stakeholder has all 
the necessary tools to respond completely to the wide range of crisis that 
routinely occur, or could occur, in our homeland.123  
Combining the capabilities, experience, and resources of multiple jurisdictions 
can be exceedingly complex and politically difficult. Local homeland security response 
capabilities are demanding, especially since there are so many potential variables like 
acts of nature or acts of violence that could affect a community. Blum and McIntyre 
posit, “The challenge in homeland response operations is neither inadequate resources 
nor lack of capabilities, but rather in being able to bring them to bear at the right time and 
place, and in the right combination.”124 Disasters in the United States can have enormous 
consequences, regardless of size and complexity; they always have the potential for loss 
of life, psychological impact, economic loss, and diminished public confidence in 
government. Enormous resources are devoted to public safety and for homeland security. 
American citizens have the right to expect that these resources will be used efficiently by 
their leaders, both elected and appointed. Finding better ways to work together is the 
responsibility of all public employees. Continuous efforts to identify areas where leaders                                                                    
122 Ibid. 
123 Steven Blum, and Kerry McIntyre, Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response Operations 
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), ix.  
124 Ibid. 
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can combine efforts and resources can enhance response. As Blum and McIntyre note, 
“There cannot be any higher priority for government than ensuring the safety of its 
citizens.”125  
D. THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Emergency management is often a confused or assumed role by other disciplines 
in the first responder profession. Many in government believe that those assigned as 
emergency managers will assume all responsibilities and require little or no support from 
other partner agencies. The misconception is great among local governments were city 
and county departments often do not train their personnel for assignments in the local 
EOC, resulting in a disparate, disorganized team, which leaves the heavy lifting to the 
few emergency managers. Emergency management, for the purpose of this analysis, is 
one that outlines specific requirements, actions, or roles and responsibilities. There are 
many varied expectations placed on emergency management by local, state, and federal 
government. The following are some federal level documents that establish clear 
emergency management expectations: The National Preparedness Goal (NPG),126 The 
National Response Framework (NRF), 127  National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP), 128  The National Incident Management System (NIMS), 129  the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), 130  and the Homeland Security Act of 
2002.131  
                                                                   
125 Ibid., 34. 
126 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal.  
127 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 3.  
128 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2009), http://emilms.fema.gov/IS821/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.  
129 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 
130 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104–321 (1996), 
http://www.emacweb.org/index.php/learnaboutemac/emac-legislation, Article II. 
131 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296 (2002), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
hr_5005_enr.pdf. 
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The guiding federal documents for emergency management address emergency 
management as a capability, discipline, organizational structure, or activity, all of which 
apply to emergency response. The National Preparedness Goal establishes an expectation 
of participation of government organizations and disciplines to include emergency 
management by stating, “National preparedness is the shared responsibility of our whole 
community. Every member contributes, including individuals, communities, the private 
and nonprofit sectors, faith based organizations, and Federal, state, and local 
governments.”132 The metric of performance is measured through the spirit and language 
of the National Preparedness Goal: “A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities 
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, 
and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”133  
Taking concepts and direction from these adopted government documents will 
help emergency managers and persons in government leadership positions better 
understand the role and responsibilities they inherit as directors of emergency services for 
their respective jurisdictions or area(s) of responsibility. The California Standardized 
Emergency Management System (SEMS) was adopted in 1993 and the federal National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) was adopted in 2005. These protocols for 
emergency response work well when implemented for the purposes they were designed to 
be used. The author agrees that there is not one universal approach to a complicated event 
(e.g., natural disaster, criminal activity or terrorist attacks). The recommendation is not to 
change existing policy, rather, to offer an opportunity for local governments to 
collaborate in a formal setting of multiagency cooperation within OAs. 
The focus of discussion should be how emergency management together can 
better respond to any human or natural caused complex event. It is the emergency 
managers who are often left out of the spotlight and suffer lack of funding, support, 
training, and exercise opportunities and lack the political support to integrate with other 
agencies in a unity of effort response to mitigation and recovery. Recovery starts when                                                                    
132 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 1.  
133 Ibid.  
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events begin. Resiliency is often not on the list of “things to do” at the onset of a crisis, 
but it should be in the forefront in emergency planning and preparation stages for local 
governments.  
This research focuses on a systems approach to solution-based problems. 
Complex events will continue to challenge emergency managers and task smaller 
jurisdictions like townships and cities with small populations and budgets. How 
government leaders approach chaos can determine the level of success and lives saved. It 
is difficult to rate how successful and well managed an event is because often times after 
action reports do not reflect embarrassing moments or lack of competence at the section 
chief or executive policy levels of an EOC operation. Therefore, decision-making failures 
at the time of crisis are sometimes not acknowledged unless there is injury or death as a 
result of negligence. However, not having all the information is exactly what first 
responders are faced with every day. It is the preparedness, planning training, and level of 
commitment that will contribute toward success and resiliency for a particular 
jurisdiction(s). Moreover, it is the relationships, knowledge, and collaborative efforts 
amongst jurisdictions within OAs and between OAs that are usually key to successful 
outcomes.  
E. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT IN COUNTIES 
In the Emergency Management in County Government, prepared by The National 
Association of Counties, the author presents data based on a national survey to county 
governments in which San Mateo County was a participant. The data and analysis in this 
section is taken from a national survey prepared for the National Center for the Study of 
Counties, authored by Wes Clarke in August 2006.134 Although the report is now dated, 
the relevance remains unchanged. The survey identified common themes in emergency 
management at the county government level that cities should know for the purpose of 
knowing a particular county’s strength and limitations within its own OAs.  
134 Wes Clark, Emergency Management in County Government: A National Survey (Athens, GA: Carl 
Vinson Institute of Government University of Georgia, 2006), http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/
documents/Emergency%20Management%20in%20County%20Government.pdf, 1.  
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The national survey found that in:  
many local governments, the emergency management function has 
traditionally been assigned to public safety units such as police/sheriff and 
fire departments. As shown in the table below, respondents to this survey 
suggest that emergency management is, for the most part, now a separate 
unit within a department of public safety (38 percent) or a stand-alone unit 
of the county government reporting directly to the chief executive or 
governing body (40 percent), meaning that 78 percent of counties 
nationally have established emergency management units separate from 
the police/sheriff and fire departments.135  
The national survey also identified disciplines under which emergency management 
functions were assigned by geographic region as identified by percentages in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Structure of emergency management unit  
 Total Northeast South Midwest West 
Stand Alone Unit 40% 37% 45% 32% 51% 
Unit within Public Safety 38% 56% 38% 40% 24% 
Unit with Police/Sheriff 7% --- 10% 2% 13% 
Unit with Fire Dept. 7% --- 1% 15% 3% 
Unit with EMS 3% 5% 1% 5% 1% 
Other 5% 2% 3% 6% 6% 
Count 448 41 162 176 68  
Clark also explains:  
Emergency management administrators have a variety of specialized 
training opportunities available to them, including state programs 
conducted by top state officials and, often, consultants or university 
faculty; a series of short courses in management development conducted 
through Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) 
regional offices; and certification through the International Association of 
Emergency Managers (IAEM). The data presented in Table 6 below 
suggest that about 40 percent of top officials and 20 to 30 percent of 
second-in-command managers have completed some form of specialized 
training. Most top managers have duties beyond coordinating the county’s 
emergency preparedness and response units.136                                                                    
135 Ibid., 8.  
136 Ibid., 9. 
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Table 6.   Specialized emergency management training of top officials* 
* Column totals do not sum to 100 percent since officials may hold more than one certification.137 
 
As shown in Table 7, more than three-quarters (77 percent) of top managers 
report responsibilities beyond emergency management; nearly 60 percent are engaged in 
at least one other major activity unrelated to emergency management, the most common 
of which is general oversight of additional county units beyond those normally associated 
with emergency services. This leaves only about one-quarter of top administrators who 
spend all of their time on emergency management and administration. However, 100 
percent effort in emergency management was the modal response, with another large 
cluster (14 percent of managers) at 50 percent of their time. Top emergency management 
officials spend an average (mean) of 67 percent of their time on emergency management 
and administration activities. The number of employees actively engaged in emergency 
administration is remarkably low.138 
                                                                   
137 Ibid.  
138 Ibid., 10.  
Top Administrator Total Northeast South Midwest West 
IAEM Certified Emergency Manager 19% 11% 22% 22% 11% 
IAEM Associate Emergency Manager 3% 2% 4% 3% 3% 
State Certification 44% 55% 50% 46% 20% 
FEMA Professional Development Series 41% 43% 42% 39% 43% 
Second in Command Total Northeast South Midwest West 
IAEM Certified Emergency Manager 7% 7% 5% 11% 4% 
IAEM Associate Emergency Manager 2% 2% 1% 5% 0% 
State Certification 22% 34% 17% 30% 8% 
FEMA Professional Development Series 25% 30% 20% 31% 21% 
Count 487 44 173 193 76 
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Table 7.   Duties beyond emergency management139 
  Total Northeast South Midwest West 
Does the top EM administrator 
have duties beyond EM? 
Yes 77% 65% 87% 69% 75% 
No 23% 35% 13% 31% 25% 
Major duties related to EM? 
Yes 59% 69% 60% 56% 54% 
No 41% 31% 40% 44% 46% 
Count  467 41 167 186 72  
As the data in Table 8 indicates, most counties operate with fewer than six 
fulltime equivalents (FTE) in the agency. The low mean and very high standard deviation 
in each category of the data indicate that there are a few large counties with significant 
numbers of staff in emergency management while the vast majority of counties have only 
a few (maybe one or two) employees assigned to this function. The mean number of 
employees per 100,000 populations is 10.27 with a standard deviation of 1.77. The data 
suggests that 95 percent of counties operate with between 6.7 and 13.7 persons engaged 
in emergency management.140 
Table 8.   Emergency management workforce141 
 Number Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
How many FT persons does the EM 
office or department employ? 315 .50 186.00 5.8262 15.36038 
How many PT persons does the EM 
office or department employ? 196 .30 400.00 6.7133 32.43091 
How many FTEs does the EM office 
or department employ? 286 .15 240.00 6.2753 21.40733 
 
The information collected from the national survey is helpful for city managers, 
police, and fire chiefs as well as county managers and elected sheriffs to know the 
balance of their particular workforce and level of expected (or perceived) expertise. 
Access to this information can help public leaders make informed decisions about 
                                                                   
139 Ibid.  
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid.  
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whether they might explore zone EOCs or multilateral agreements with neighboring 
jurisdictions. Most local governments do not have the capacities to staff fully activated 
EOCs for events with extended response timelines. Multilateral, multi-jurisdictional 
collaborative agreements can help fill the gaps in the area of staffing and expertise, and 





APPENDIX C. COORDINATION CHALLENGES FOR MAJOR 
EVENTS IN THE SAN MATEO COUNTY OPERATIONAL AREA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix highlights coordination challenges in major events that occurred in 
the San Mateo County OA. Case studies are presented and discussed summarizing 
lessons learned and recommendations.  
B. ASIANA AIRPLANE CRASH 
The July 6, 2013 Asiana Airplane accident at the San Francisco International 
Airport, Millbrae, CA offers an example of a predictable surprise. It was a situation in 
which pilots from a South Korean airline company received substandard training and 
lacked the necessary training and experience to land a jumbo jet onto an airstrip with a 
sea wall. The Asiana Airline incident also brought attention to the San Francisco 
International Airport, a San Mateo County special district, and how the politics of crisis 
management affected the airport director’s decision to coordinate resource requests with 
the city and county of San Francisco instead of with its assigned operational area of San 
Mateo County.   
1. Summary 
According to the National Transportation Safety Board: “On July 6, 2013, at 
approximately 11:28 AM, a Boeing 777–200, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, 
was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International 
Airport (SFIA), San Francisco, California.”142 Three of the 291 passengers were fatally 
injured. One crewmember, eight flight attendants, and 40 passengers were seriously 
injured. Furthermore, 248 passengers, “four flight attendants and three flight 
crewmembers received minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed on impact forces and 
                                                                   
142 National Transportation Safety Board, Board Meeting: Crash of Asiana Flight 214 Accident 
Report Summary, 2014, accessed August 31, 2015, http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/
2014_Asiana_BMG-Abstract.aspx, 1. 
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the subsequent fire.”143 Upon notification that an airplane crashed, a Code 2000 (dispatch 
code for airplane crash) protocol was activated by San Mateo County Public Safety 
Communications (PSC). Law enforcement established posts along the U.S. 101 freeway 
off ramps to SFIA and enacted its closure plan. Fire units were dispatched for mutual aid. 
Hospitals were alerted to receive patients and EMS units dispatched ambulances to the 
scene. A subsequent law enforcement mobile field force was activated to search for 
evidence in the runway. The SFIA Department Operations Center was activated, as was 
the San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (SF DEM) EOC and the San 
Mateo County OA EOC to support airport resource requests.  
2. Lessons Learned 
During the event, responding units experienced lack of radio communications 
interoperability leading to challenges in integrating responding mutual aid resources. 
Reports of excess death counts were provided to local hospitals who were preparing for 
maximum surge capacity. EMS patient tracking via ambulance transports was inaccurate, 
which created confusion for receiving hospitals. As the responsible OA of jurisdiction, 
San Mateo County activated its OA EOC; however, the OA EOC did not have direct 
communications or receive resource requests from SFIA. Instead, SFIA communicated 
with the SF DEM. Web EOC was not utilized to document the incident and manage 
resource requests, creating unclear situational awareness. San Mateo County sent a 
county OES district coordinator to the SFIA DOC and relied on local television news 
reports for timely information.  
The Asiana airplane crash provides an excellent case proving the need for 
multilateral agreements between OAs. The SFIA is considered a special district that has 
reporting responsibility to two OAs, San Mateo County, the geographic host to the 
airport, and SF DEM which is the political host to the airport. The lack of clarity and 
unity of effort caused valuable missed communication, confusion with resource requests, 
and multiple self-dispatched law and fire units from two counties, in violation of the 
framework established by SEMS. Better intra-OA coordination with the affected cities in                                                                    
143 Ibid. 
 85 
the north zone of the San Mateo County OA would have helped effectively coordinate an 
airport closure or evacuation. Having no coordination in place, the cities would have to 
activate their own EOCs and coordinate independently with the San Mateo County OA 
EOC, which was already experiencing communication challenges with the SFIA DOC 
due to SF DEM’s direct oversight of the incident.  
C. SAN BRUNO PIPELINE EXPLOSION 
The Glenview Fire incident in San Bruno, CA offers an example of a predictable 
surprise, a situation in which PG&E was identified as the entity at fault. The Glenview 
Fire incident also highlighted the capacity of a small city’s ability to manage a complex, 
prolonged event.   
1. Summary 
In a report by San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services, it states, “On the 
evening of September 9, 2010, a massive explosion fueled by a ruptured high pressure 
natural gas pipeline tore through the Crestmoor residential neighborhood in San Bruno, 
CA,144 (known as “the Glenview Fire”). The fire claimed the lives of six people and 
injured 60 six more. The six-alarm fire destroyed 38 homes, a city park, a public water, 
sewer and wastewater system, and storm drain services caused damages to 42 more 
homes. Property damage exceeded $55 million and subsequent lawsuits resulted in the 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) paying out over $1.6 billion dollars in fines 
and restitution.145  
The city of San Bruno manager and the San Mateo County manager declared a 
local state of emergency to the governor’s office. Over five hundred public safety 
personnel responded to the call for mutual aid. The city of San Bruno activated its EOC 
and was immediately overwhelmed, requiring staff and resource support from it fire 
protection district, neighboring cities, and San Mateo County. In the incident, 400 homes 
                                                                   
144 San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services, Glenview Fire, September 9, 2010 After Action 
Report (San Mateo, CA: San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services, 2011), 11.  
145 Ibid. 
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were evacuated and shelters were established. The incident lasted for 13 days until the 
county-led OA EOC demobilized and dispatchers were relieved of duty. However, a 
family assistance center and other resources were still open and operational to support 
residents who lost their homes.  
2. Lessons Learned 
For a city of only 42,000 in population and a small city employee staff to support 
its day-to-day tasks, the city of San Bruno was resilient based on a number of factors: 
existing working relationships among the responding agencies proved beneficial, 
emergency management staff at the city EOC and county-led OA EOC successfully 
demonstrated the ability to activate, mobilize, and operate the EOCs, and responding 
agencies were disciplined enough to identify a staging area and maintained a good 
perimeter. However, a lack of intra-OA multilateral agreements between jurisdictions 
caused a breakdown in communications and emergency response roles for the mutual aid 
responder, the SFIA DOC and the responding SFIA fire department.  
According to the San Mateo County OES, some “areas of improvement were 
communications between the incident command post, city EOC and OA EOC.”146 The 
lack of a JIC for press releases and rumor control was not in place, neither was a formal 
multiagency coordination system where trained personnel could respond to help manage 
the effort and relieve the City of San Bruno staff of some responsibilities, including the 
city manager. Intra-OA multilateral collaborative agreements between the City of San 
Bruno and neighboring jurisdictions would have proven valuable and helpful in assisting 
to further enhance the effectiveness of the coordination and support of the response.  
D. MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL FLOOD RESPONSE 
Most creeks of San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties flow into the San Francisco 
Bay. During high tides, creeks cannot drain as conveniently, causing the push back of a 
significant amount of water back into the local communities. A significant rain storm 
would not create alarm in most communities, however, when a lengthy storm makes                                                                    
146 Ibid. 
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landfall, causing coastal creeks to overflow with no outlet to drain during the Pacific 
Ocean’s high tide, cascading effects are likely to occur.   
1. Summary 
On December 11, 2014, a significant rainstorm fell on northern California, 
affectionately called “the Pineapple Express,” summoned by its origin in the tropical 
northwest pacific region. The San Mateo County OA received up to nine inches of rain 
within a few hours. Areas within the OA most affected were the cities of San Bruno, 
Belmont, Redwood City, La Honda, and the SFIA. Due to the higher elevations of some 
of these jurisdictions, other low lying jurisdictions of South San Francisco, Belmont, 
Redwood City, and Pescadero suffered flooding from run off.  
The county-led OA EOC was activated and City of South San Francisco also 
activated its EOC. Field command posts were established in the cities of Belmont and 
Redwood City. The flooding required evacuations of mobile home parks, residential 
neighborhoods, and businesses. Shelters were opened in the cities of South San Francisco 
and San Mateo to house over 100 evacuees for up to three days. The response effort was 
significant, primarily for: fire agencies, special districts, human services on-call 
personnel, the American Red Cross, private sector partners, community emergency 
response teams (CERT), and the San Mateo County OES. The director of emergency 
services for the San Mateo County OA later declared a disaster proclamation to the 
California governor’s office for public damages of up to $3.8 million dollars. Private 
parties with losses were provided assistance from a local assistance center (LAC) 
established by the State of California Governor’s OES (Cal OES).  
2. Lessons Learned 
San Mateo County OES was criticized for not establishing field command posts 
and not providing adequate resource support to local agencies via the county-led OA 
EOC and county OES district coordinator support. OES was further criticized by city 
jurisdictions in the affected areas for not staffing emergency shelters for multiple 
operational periods. However, the county OES did staff the shelters, did respond to all 
areas affected by flooding, and did activate its county-led OA EOC, as required by 
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SEMS. The experience taught the county OES that jurisdictions and county agencies 
were not prepared to effectively respond to the disaster, and there was a lack of a proper 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities per SEMS.  
The absence of intra-OA multilateral collaborative agreements between 
jurisdictions caused a breakdown in communications and emergency response roles 
during response and recovery efforts. County response resources and capabilities were 
stretched as multiple cities were simultaneously flooded at the northern and southern 
zones of the San Mateo County OA—all of which also required evacuation and sheltering 
of displaced residents. Due to the complexity of having multiple incidents (at the same 
time calling for the same resources), better intra-OA coordination and pre-established, 
multilateral, collaborative agreements would have been helpful to organize a more 
efficient response. This would have also enabled local jurisdictions to better understand 
and assist with the overall response efforts.  
E. KEY FINDINGS 
In the case studies presented, each has a common theme: the challenges local 
governments’ face with a no notice, large-scale, complex event that requires a 
multiagency, multi-government, coordinated response. Whether a terrorist attack or a 
natural disaster or a predictable surprise, like the Asiana airplane crash or the PG&E 
pipeline explosion, each event can expose gaps in the readiness of smaller jurisdictions 
and the need for multi-jurisdictional collaborative partnerships. Each case study, although 
differing in application and scope, required the same level of government response from 
the same public safety disciplines. Each incident required strategic coordination and 
support from EOCs and multi-jurisdictional unity of effort for response and recovery.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The events related to public safety response constructively evaluate and assess the 
operational and managerial challenges and identify the unique issues and challenges 
faced by local governments. The summaries offer a reminder for emergency managers 
and other stakeholders with practical recommendations to consider for future incidents. It 
is not the intent of this report to convey every detail or element related to each incident as 
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they are beyond the scope of the review. It is also not the author’s intention to second-
guess any of the actions or decisions of the officials or responders who were involved in 
the events. Often times, decisions are made quickly and without the luxury of 
discretionary time. First responders live in dynamic and extraordinary environments and 
respond to calls facing a variety of challenges without the benefit of hindsight. 
Ultimately, the responses were effective in mitigating the threats without the further loss 
of life.  
Overall continuity of operations, although briefly interrupted, continued to 
sustain, which is a testament to the resiliency, professionalism, training, and bravery of 
the public safety personnel and civilians who responded to the scene(s). An analysis and 
a snapshot of lessons learned may provide other agencies and stakeholders with an 
understanding of the challenges and recommendations for possible improvements to 
mutual aid response to complex, on-going, critical situations, other emergencies or 
disasters that may require a large-scale, multiagency, coordinated intra-OA response. 
Having pre-established multilateral, multi-jurisdictional, collaborative agreements in 
place will be most helpful for local jurisdictions to rely on for established roles of 
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